Fordham Law Review
Volume 54

Issue 5

Article 3

1986

Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of
Federal Court Power over State Court Proceedings
Robert B. Funkhouser
Kenneth R. Levine
Laurie B. McGhee
David E. Mollon

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert B. Funkhouser, Kenneth R. Levine, Laurie B. McGhee, and David E. Mollon, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power over State Court Proceedings, 54 Fordham L.
Rev. 767 (1986).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol54/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

COMMENT
TEXACO INC. v. PENNZOIL CO.: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE
LIMITS OF FEDERAL COURT POWER OVER STATE
COURT PROCEEDINGS
"[I]f a playwright were to give this case a name, I would suggest he
would call it: 'Something Funny Happened on the Way to Austin' or
'to the United States Supreme Court in Washington.' "*
"[W]hat has developed here, your Honors, was not funny at all."*
INTRODUCTION

While the humor may depend on one's perspective, the litigation between Texaco and Pennzoil has provided a fascinating exposition of federalism. The controversy has pitted Pennzoil, the holder of the largest
civil judgment in history,' against Texaco, the fifth largest company in
the United States,2 in a confrontation over federalism, comity, judicial
restraint and the Anti-Injunction Act.'
The contract dispute underlying the federal action evolved from Texaco's acquisition of Getty Oil following a heated tender offer competition
against Pennzoil. 4 A few days after Texaco announced the acquisition,
Pennzoil sued Getty, its affiliates and Texaco in Delaware state court for
damages and equitable relief, alleging that the Getty entities had
* Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Arthur L. Liman, opening remarks for Pennzoil).
** Id.at 95 (Paul J. Curran, arguing for Texaco).
1. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986).
2. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 252 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986); Fortune, April 29, 1985, at 266.
3. This Comment will not discuss the substantive law underlying the lawsuits in
Texas and Delaware.
4. On January 4, 1984, Getty Oil and Pennzoil announced in press releases that they
had reached an "agreement in principle" for Pennzoil to purchase three-sevenths of the
shares of Getty Oil, "subject to execution of a definitive merger agreement," at a price of
$112.50 per share. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 255 & n.4
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986); Pennzoil Co. v.
Getty Oil Co., No. 7425, slip op. at 14-15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 1984) (available Apr. 13,
1986, on LEXIS, States library, Del file).
After the January 4th press releases, Getty's investment banker approached Texaco
and solicited a competing bid. See Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., No. 7425, slip op. at
44-45 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 1984) (available Apr. 13, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Del file).
The extent of Texaco's knowledge of the Pennzoil agreement remains disputed. See id. at
46-47. In any event, Texaco offered to purchase all Getty Oil shares for $125 (later raised
to $128) per share in cash. Pennzoil declined to make a counterbid. See Amended Complaint of Texaco at 10, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter cited as Amended
Complaint].
Between January 6 and 8, 1984, Texaco and the Getty entities signed definitive agreements. The Getty Oil shareholders then tendered their shares to Texaco. Id. at 10-11
(indication of 1985 is a typographical error).
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breached a contract agreeing to the buyout and that Texaco had tor-

tiously induced the breach.' On February 6, 1984, the Delaware chancery court denied Pennzoil's motion to enjoin the sale.6

Two days later, Pennzoil voluntarily dismissed Texaco from the Delaware action and simultaneously reinstituted suit in Texas. Pennzoil
sought $7.53 billion in compensatory damages plus punitive damages.7
Texaco tried unsuccessfully to quash the dismissal in Delaware8 and then
answered the Texas complaint on March 7, 1984.'
In Texas, Judge Anthony J.P. Farris presided over eight months of
pretrial motions and discovery.' 0 After more than three months of trial
and 17,000 transcript pages, and with the case seventy-five percent complete, Judge Farris stepped down due to illness." The case continued
5. See Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., No. 7425, slip op. at 1-3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6,
1984) (available Apr. 13, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Del file).
6. See id. at 47-49. The Delaware court found that a binding agreement could be
proved between Pennzoil and Getty but found insufficient likelihood of success on the
actual knowledge and active inducement elements of Pennzoil's claim against Texaco to
justify injunctive relief, see id. at 47, or for Pennzoil's alternate motion to hold the shares
separate, see id. at 48-49.
7. Complaint of Pennzoil Co., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist.
Dec. 10, 1985).
8. See Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 473 A.2d 358, 359 (Del. Ch. 1984). Texaco
later unsuccessfully appealed the Chancery Court decision. Texaco also attempted to
fight the Texas action by seeking a declaratory judgment in Delaware. This too failed.
See Pennzoil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., No. 7425, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 1984)
(available Apr. 13, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Del file).
9. Answer of Texaco Inc., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist.
Dec. 10, 1985).
10. One of the issues in the Texas litigation that carried over into the federal court
action concerned the role of Judge Farris. He received a $10,000 campaign contribution
from Pennzoil's chief trial counsel, Joseph D. Jamail, on March 7, 1984, two days after
Texaco's answer was filed. See Hearing Transcript on Texaco's Motion to Recuse at 1819, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist. Oct. 25, 1984). Judge Farris
was running unopposed in the primary, and the sum was large by local standards. See N.
at 19-20. Mr. Jamail also contributed $10,000 to the Honorable Peter S. Solito, who, as
Presiding Judge of Harris County, assigned cases. See Memorandum in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 5 n.2, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F.
Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter cited as Texaco TRO Application]. When Texaco learned of the contribution six
months later, it sought recusal, arguing that the contribution and Mr. Jamail's campaign
activity on behalf of Judge Farris, combined with discovery and pretrial rulings "uniformly in Pennzoil's favor," created at least the appearance of unfairness. Id. at 5. That
motion was denied. Id.
The federal courts were similarly unsympathetic to Texaco's claim of unfairness on this
account. Judge Brieant, who otherwise upheld all of Texaco's claims, disparaged this
one, declaring that "judicial goodwill" from such contributions would at most garner
acceptance of a late brief, "a golfing continuance" or the contributing attorney's "jokes
may evoke more judicial laughter than they otherwise deserve." Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 254 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133
(2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit was similarly dismissive. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 110-11, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) (remarks of Mansfield & Pierce, J.J.)
[hereinafter cited as Transcript of Oral Argument].
11. See Texaco TRO Application, supra note 10, at 6. Texaco argued that Farris' ill
health also contributed to the unfairness of the Texas trial. Texaco contended that Farris
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under Judge Solomon Casseb."2
On November 19, 1985, after four and one-half months of trial and
eleven hours of deliberation, the Texas jury announced its verdict for
Pennzoil. 3 Judge Casseb subsequently denied Texaco's motion for judgment n.o.v.14 and entered judgment for $11.12 billion on December 10,
1985.'1 Post-judgment interest accrued at the rate of approximately $3.0
million a day.' 6
Under Texas law, to stay execution of judgment pending appeal, an
appellant must post a supersedeas bond "in at least the amount of the
maintained a relatively steady trial schedule during Pennzoil's presentation but that his
deteriorating health and the consequent intermittent court schedule caused Texaco's
presentation to be "disjointed, interrupted and confused." Id Of the 58 half-days available for Texaco's presentation only 21 were used. Id
12. Id.at 6. Judge Casseb was a practicing lawyer from San Antonio who had been a
judge from 1960 to 1968 and who was assigned as a "retired judge" under Texas law.
Judge Casseb stated that he had not read the record, would not read it, and would not
reconsider any of Judge Farris' rulings. Texaco moved for mistrial. That motion was
denied. See Brief for Respondent at 16, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d
Cir. 1986) [hereinafter cited as Texaco Brief].
Texaco's attack on Judge Casseb's qualifications continued after trial. Texaco sought a
hearing on whether Judge Casseb met Texas' 12-year service requirement for retired
judges. Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 18, col. 4. The issue was appealed to the Texas
Supreme Court, which ultimately refused to grant a hearing or discovery. Id.
Texaco's attacks on Judge Casseb apparently have had some effect on the Texas state
action. When Texaco requested a new trial after the verdict, Judge Casseb asked Texaco
if it was still questioning his qualifications to preside; told that it was, the judge simply
declared: "Y'all are excused." Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1986, at 18, col. 1.
13. See Adler, How to Lose the Bet-Your-Company Case, Jan./Feb. Am. Law. 27, 27
(1986).
Among other things, the jury apparently reached its decision based partly on a misunderstanding of the concepts of indemnity and agreement in principle, a belief that Texaco
witness Martin Lipton (the "world-renowned and widely respected takeover expert" at
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) was not credible, and on Texaco's decision to not offer
evidence on damages. See id.
14. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1986).
Texaco unsuccessfully challenged the trial court's instructions on New York law as
follows: the requirement of actual knowledge as opposed to constructive knowledge that
the judge's charge allowed, the judge's instruction that an "agreement in principle" expressly "subject to" the execution of a definitive agreement constitutes an enforceable
contract; the need to show active inducement rather than mere knowledge that the other
contractual party will be unable to perform; the judge's failure to bar Pennzoil's claim for
the value of the reserves rather than the market value of the stock, and without discounting to present value; permitting punitive damages without proof of motivation of ill will
or hatred rather than mere economic benefit. See Texaco Brief, supra note 12, at 16-19.
15. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986). Pennzoil had requested S7.53 billion
based on the calculated difference between what it would have cost Pennzoil to get
Getty's reserves under the original deal versus obtaining the oil by exploration. Texaco,
for tactical reasons, did not offer any damage evidence or controvert Pennzoil's evidence.
See Adler, supra note 13, at 109. The jury awarded punitive damages of $3.0 billion. The
amount was determined by a juror's suggestion that the jury award Pennzoil S 1.0 billion
in punitive damages for each indemnity offered by Texaco. The jury apparently believed
that by indemnifying the Getty entities Texaco became liable for their acts. Id.
16. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986).
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judgment interests and costs."' 7 Texas could not possibly post such an
amount,' and so risked seizure of its assets prior to an appeal of the
judgment.' 9 However, with Judge Casseb's prodding, the parties agreed
to add provisions to the judgment itself that barred Pennzoil from enforcing the judgment and barred Texaco from transferring or encumbering assets except in the ordinary course of business for as long as the trial
court retained jurisdiction.2"
17. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364 provides in part:
Rule 364. Supersedeas Bond or Deposit
(a) May Suspend Execution. Unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, an appellant may suspend the execution of the judgment by filing a good
and sufficient bond to be approved by the clerk, or making the deposit provided
by Rule 14c, payable to the appellee in the amount provided below, conditioned
that the appellant shall prosecute his appeal or writ of error with effect and, in
case the judgment of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals shall be against
him, he shall perform its judgment, sentence or decree and pay all such damages as said court may award against him.
(b) Money Judgment. When the judgment awards recovery of a sum of
money, the amount of the bond or deposit shall be at least the amount of the
judgment, interest, and costs.
18. The total worldwide surety bond capacity is estimated to be between $1.0 billion
and $1.5 billion. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986).
19. Texaco had an estimated $5.0 billion worth of real property in Texas. Id. at 1138.
Under Texas law a judgment creditor may place liens on a judgment debtor's real
property located in Texas immediately after entry of judgment. The judgment lien attaches to all of the judgment debtor's property in the jurisdiction immediately upon recording and indexing. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 52.001-.006.
In addition, a judgment is enforceable by execution 30 days after its entry or, if a
motion for new trial is made, 30 days after its denial, unless the judgment debtor obtains
a stay of execution. Such a stay may be obtained for a money judgment, only by posting a
supersedeas bond in "at least the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs." Tex. R.
Civ. P. 364(b).
Texaco argued that its right to appeal would be meaningless because Pennzoil could
file liens as soon as Judge Casseb's jurisdiction ended, which would occur at the latest on
March 25, 1986. See Texaco Brief, supra note 12, at 20-21 & n.26. Without the stay,
Texaco would face liens against its property for the total amount of the judgment. Id.
Texaco contended, and the federal courts agreed, that this would probably force Texaco
into bankruptcy or liquidation. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d
Cir. 1986); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
20. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1986); Wall St. J.,
Mar. 14, 1986, at 18, col. 2. The protective provisions were contained in the seventh
paragraph of the judgment [hereinafter cited as paragraph 7]. Paragraph 7 prevented
Pennzoil from abstracting, registering or executing the judgment while Texaco was prevented from pledging, encumbering or conveying assets outside of the ordinary course of
business. Pennzoil was threatened with a new trial should it violate the provisions. Texaco was subject to immediate enforcement of the judgment should it violate the agreement or file a petition for bankruptcy. See Texaco TRO Application, supra note 10, at 13
n.5.
During negotiations to decide the terms of the portion of the judgment protecting Texaco, both sides were on the brink of drastic action. Texaco had stationed an attorneyprotected by a bodyguard-at a telephone outside Judge Casseb's chambers to remain in
contact with a Texaco lawyer in New York to facilitate instant filing of bankruptcy papers if the judge entered the full damage award. Meanwhile, Pennzoil had dispatched
aides to various county courthouses in order to immediately file liens on Texaco property
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Hours before the Texas court entered its decree, Texaco filed a federal
complaint in the Southern District of New York.2 Texaco sought and
obtained from Judge Charles L. Brieant an emergency ex parte temporary restraining order on December 17, 1985 that enjoined Pennzoil from
enforcing the Texas judgment.2 2
Texaco's complaint alleged that the Texas judgment and the Texas lien
and supersedeas bond provisions would violate Texaco's rights under the
commerce, supremacy, full faith and credit, due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, as well as under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871,23 the Securities Exchange Act of 193424 and rules promulgated
thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 5
should the judgment be affirmed without restriction. Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1986, at 1, col.
6, at 18, col. 2.
Texaco subsequently sought to modify paragraph 7 to prevent Pennzoil from attaching
Texaco's property or executing the judgment prior to final appellate review, or alternatively, to require notice and a hearing prior to execution and to clarify the meaning of
"ordinary course of business" to ease the fears of Texaco's lenders. See Texaco TRO
Application, supra note 10, at 16. Pennzoil objected to the modifications and none were
made. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986); Texaco TRO
Application, supra note 10, at 16.
Texaco maintained in federal court that paragraph 7 could not protect it from financial
ruin in part because the state court's jurisdiction would expire, at the latest, on March 25,
1986, and with it the protection of paragraph 7. According to Texaco, this deadline and
the amount of the bond produced a serious crisis: its bonds were downgraded and its
credit lines shrank; unsecured borrowing became unavailable and even secured financing
uncertain; suppliers, joint venturers and purchasers of Texaco assets shied away from
dealing with it. See Texaco Brief, supra note 12, at 2-3 & n.2; Amended Complaint, supra
note 4, at 5. The Second Circuit seemingly accepted these claims. See Texaco Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986).
21. See Texaco Complaint, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
22. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd inpart
and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
25. See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 24-31. Texaco's claims in the
Amended Complaint were summarized by the Second Circuit as follows:
(1) that the Texas judgment excessively burdened interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and frustrated the purposes of the Williams Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)(0, by deterring competitive tender offers after a
target company [Getty] and a given bidder [Pennzoil] had conducted negotiations... ; (2) that the Texas lien and supersedeas bond provisions, by preventing Texaco from effectively prosecuting appeals to the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court, and eventually to the United States
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), were void under the Supremacy,
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution...
; (3) that the Texas judgment permitted Pennzoil to engage in unlawful conduct
in violation of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78m, 78n and
Rule 10b-13 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13, namely, the purchase of Getty
stock other than pursuant to Pennzoil's outstanding tender offer... ; (4) that
the judgment violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by disregarding the
substantive law of New York, which the parties agreed governed . . . and
(5) that the judgment was the product of fundamental unfairness in violation of
the Due Process Clause ....
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On December 20, 1985, Pennzoil submitted a cross-motion to dissolve
the temporary restraining order and dismiss the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. 26 Pennzoil also tendered to Texaco a "stipulation" that purported to give the Texas trial judge the power
to substitute federal bond standards in place of the Texas supersedeas
bond provisions.2 7 The offer was not accepted by the Texas trial judge or
by Texaco.28
Denouncing the Texas judgment as "absurd, ' 29 Judge Brieant granted

the relief requested by Texaco on all counts on January 10, 1986.30
Judge Brieant also stated that Texaco would be entitled to litigate the

federal claims raised in its complaint even after a final state court deci-

sion on the merits.3" Finally, the court recalculated the maximum damages Pennzoil
could conceivably obtain 32 and set Texaco's bond at $1.0
33
billion.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that Judge Brieant had properly
exercised jurisdiction over Texaco's due process and equal protection
Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986).
All of the claims except for the attack under (2) had been raised in the state proceedings
as part of Texaco's motion for a new trial. See id. at 1137.
26. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
27. See id. at 257. The effect of Pennzoil's proffered stipulation was much disputed.
Judge Brieant found that the stipulation had no effect because the Texas courts had "no
power to give a stay pending appeal, except upon full compliance with Rule 364." Id. at
258. Pennzoil contended that the stipulation waived its rights to execute the judgment
once the Texas court determined the proper amount of security using the standards of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. See Brief for Appellant at 11-12 & n.4, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter cited as Pennzoil Brief]. Texaco countered that
the waiver could not affect Texas' mandatory statutory requirement. See Texaco Brief,
supra note 12, at 27. The Second Circuit concluded that the stipulation did not adequately protect Texaco's interests. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1156
(2d Cir. 1986).
28. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1140 (2d Cir. 1986).
29. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
30. See id. at 262. Judge Brieant disclaimed any intent "to sit as a final or intermediate appellate state court as to the merits of the Texas action." Id. at 254. His opinion,
however, evaluated the likelihood of success of a Texaco appeal in Texas state courts as
part of his application of the Second Circuit's injunction standard. See id. at 253-54.
Judge Brieant found "a substantial likelihood of success on a number of [Texaco's] nonfederal points for appellate review in Texas," id. at 253, and determined that the federal
claims were "fair ground for litigation," id. at 258. He therefore held that injunctive
relief was required to guarantee that the Texas security requirements did not deprive
Texaco of its right to appeal. See id.
31. See id. at 259.
32. See id. at 254-55. Judge Brieant determined that under New York law no punitive damages could have been awarded and that a reviewing court in Texas would so find.
See id. at 254. He then recalculated the compensatory damages based on the difference
between what Pennzoil had offered and what Texaco ultimately paid for Getty. Under
this formula he found that $800 million was the most Pennzoil could legitimately obtain.
See id. at 255.
33. See id. at 261-62. Judge Brieant used the recalculated damage figure plus interest
and attorneys' fees to reach this amount for Texaco's security bond. See id.
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claims and that he had properly granted injunctive relief for the due process claim.3 4 Thus Texaco received the guarantee of protection against
enforcement of the Texas judgment it needed to pursue meaningful state
appellate review. With regard to the other claims, however, the Second
Circuit sharply criticized Judge Brieant for "what amounts to an impermissible appellate review of issues that have already been adjudicated by
the Texas trial court.",35 Accordingly, the court dismissed the remaining
claims, 36 thereby barring the possibility raised by Judge Brieant that, after a final Texas decision, the federal court would retain jurisdiction.
The unique circumstances of this case presented the Second Circuit
with two conflicting interests. On one hand, the case implicated the doctrines of jurisdiction, the Anti-Injunction Act and abstention, which are
central to the dual judicial system; on the other, the very existence of one
of the world's largest corporations was essentially placed in the hands of
the Second Circuit. Inevitably, the "hydraulic pressures"3 of this case
revealed deep conflicts inherent in the dual judicial system and the doctrines designed to aid the functioning of that system. In light of this
confluence of issues, this Comment seeks to address the doctrines involved and present alternative approaches to the analysis of these
doctrines.
Part I of the Comment discusses the Second Circuit's application of
what is known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its finding of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. It concurs with the court's conclusion
that Rooker-Feldman concerns barred consideration of many claims, but
notes that the court's extension of the "state action" element of section
1983 probably has little practical value as precedent. Moreover, it suggests that the unique factual considerations that influenced the court
should not have been part of its jurisdictional analysis.
Part II examines the issues underlying the Second Circuit's statement
that jurisdiction under Section 1983 automatically excepts a case from
the purview of the Anti-Injunction Act. This Part reviews the history of
the statute and suggests that the establishment of Section 1983 as a congressionally authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act conflicts
fundamentally with abstention doctrine. Moreover, the Second Circuit's
decision illustrates how these inconsistent developments enable federal
courts to define for themselves the circumstances under which they will
enjoin state proceedings.
Part III examines the conclusion of both the district court and the
Second Circuit that abstention was not required in deference to the Texas
state proceedings. Part III first sets forth the elements of the abstention
34. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1986).
35. See id at 1143.

36. See id. at 1144.
37. See Pennzoil Brief, supra note 27, at 1-2 (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United

States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

3" and Railroad Commission
doctrines of Younger v. Harris
v. Pullman
39
Co. It then explores the Second Circuit's application of the two doc-

trines. Finally, this Part reapplies the principles of federalism and comity underlying abstention and concludes that the federal courts should
have at least temporarily abstained from hearing the case until Texaco
had presented its challenge to a state court.
I.

JURISDICTION

Federal district courts have no power to hear a case unless expressly
authorized to do so." ° Texaco alleged seven causes of action in its
amended complaint, 4 asserting jurisdiction under three different federal
statutes.42 Five of these claims challenged various aspects of the rule of
law employed by the Texas trial court in deciding this case (Pennzoil

rule), as well as the alleged procedural unfairness of that litigation43

38. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
39. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
40. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 701-02
(1982) ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction"); A.L. Rowan & Son, Inc. v.
Department of Hous, and Urban Dev., 611 F.2d 997, 998 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[lT]hejurisdiction of United States district courts is limited"); Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366, 367
(7th Cir.) ("District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction"), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
1001 (1964). See generally C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 7 (4th ed. 1983)
(discussing the jurisdiction of federal district courts).
41. See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 24-31.
42. See id. at 6.
43. See id. at 24-31.
Throughout the litigation in federal court Texaco referred to the jury charge given by
Judge Casseb as the Pennzoil rule. See id. at 2; Texaco Brief, supra note 12, at 43 n.69.
Texaco alleged in its fifth claim that the Judge misinterpreted several aspects of New
York's law of tortious interference with contract in his jury charge. See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 28-29; Affidavit of Hugh R. Jones at 2, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 10, 1985). By employing the phrase "Pennzoil
rule," Texaco probably intended to make the jury charge appear the equivalent of a state
law. This would have been important in making out the claims under the supremacy and
commerce clauses. See infra. Although a shrewd strategy, it ultimately proved unnecessary because the claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See infra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
A brief review of Texaco's claims will provide useful background for analyzing jurisdiction. Texaco's first cause of action alleged that the Pennzoil rule unduly burdens interstate commerce by deterring competing tender offers, in violation of the commerce
clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Texaco based this claim on Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982). See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 25. This claim, however,
differs in two ways from the one in MITE. First, in MITE, the plaintiff proceeded against
the state attorney general to enjoin enforcement of the challenged anti-takeover statute.
See MITE, 457 U.S. at 626. Texaco, conversely, sued a private party-Pennzoil. See
Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 24. Second, in MITE, the Court held a state statute unconstitutional. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 630. Texaco, however, alleged that tile
Texas judge's jury charge was unconstitutional. See Amended Complaint, supra note 4,
at 2-3, 24.
The second and fourth causes of action alleged that the judgment and the Pennzoil rule
violate the supremacy clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, col. 2, because they contravene, respectively, the purposes and policies of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-()
(1982), and SEC Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1986). See Amended Complaint,
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under the supremacy,' commerce,4 5 full faith and credit4 6 and due process clauses4 7 of the Constitution. The two remaining claims each atsupra note 4, at 24-25, 27-28. The difficulty these claims present is that Texaco is outside
the class that Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission intended to protect by
these regulations, namely investors. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633; Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1967); 34
Fed. Reg. 15,838, 15,839 (1969) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1986)).
Texaco's fifth cause of action alleged that "the Judgment and the Pennzoil rule disregard important New York laws, interests and policies in violation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, [U.S. Const., art. IV, § I]." Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 28.
Texaco claimed that Texas' misapplication of the New York law of tortious interference
"subject[ed] New York law to preemption and invalidation," Amended Complaint, supra
note 4, at 29, because the Pennzoil rule contravenes paramount federal law, as alleged in
claims two and four. This is clearly untrue because one state's interpretation of a sister
state's law is neither authoritative nor binding on that state's courts. See Petition of
Goss, 249 F. Supp. 109, 110 (D. Hawaii 1966); Nesbitt v. Clark, 272 Pa. 161, 165, 116 A.
404, 404, cerL denied, 258 U.S. 621 (1922). Second, Texaco claimed that the Pennzoil
rule frustrates New York policy to foster "open market activity in connection with tender
offers." Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 29. In light of New York's newly enacted
anti-takeover statute, however, it is not clear that New York policy favors tender offers.
See Act of Dec. 16, 1985, ch. 915, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2415 (to be codified at N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law. §§ 513(e), 912 (McKinney Supp. 1986)). This law makes it significantly
more difficult to effectuate a hostile takeover of a New York corporation without approval by the target company's board. See generally Pinto, Constitutionality of New
York's New Takeover Statute, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 4 (discussing the provisions of § 912. The premise of the statute is that hostile takeovers divert management's
attention, thereby hurting the long-term growth of corporations. Id at 30, col. 1. See
Memorandum Regarding Draft Proposal at 1, 5-6 (released Oct. 30, 1985 by Governor's

Counsel).
Finally, Texaco's seventh cause of action alleged that the judgment and the Pennzoil
rule are the "product of fundamental procedural unfairness, based upon all the surrounding circumstances of the Pennzoil action." Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 30.
Although this may be the most meritorious of Texaco's dismissed claims, it also presents
the thorniest issues, involving alleged improprieties by and qualifications of the two
judges who oversaw the Texas trial. See Motion for Recusal or Disqualification at 2,
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 10, 1985) (seeking the
disqualification or recusal of Judge Anthony J.D. Farris for receiving a S 10,000 campaign
contribution from Pennzoil's chief trial counsel); Motion to Disqualify at 2, Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-05905 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 10, 1985) (challenging the qualifications of Judge Solomon Casseb, who replaced Judge Farris, to sit as a Texas judge);
Petzinger & Sullivan, Texaco-Pennzoil Legal Fight to Feature Wealth of Issues Besides
Appeals Bond, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1986, at 6, col. 1, col. 2 (discussing the alleged canpaign contribution to Judge Farris).
An interesting sidelight to these allegations is the exchange of letters between Judge
Farris and Thomas R. McDade, a partner at Fulbright & Jaworski, the firm that represented Texaco in Texas. See Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 6. In an unrelated case,
Judge Farris, in setting briefing rules, instructed counsel, which included Mr. McDade,
not to cite any decisions of White Plains federal judges. Id. In response to a letter from
Mr. McDade expressing hope that the Judge would have the "courage" to lay aside his
prejudice toward Texaco, the Judge, in a reference to the "male anatomy," wrote that he
"ha[d] more [expletive deleted] than any partner or associate at" Fulbright and Jaworski.
Id (brackets in original). This exchange suggests that federal intervention has caused
friction between the state and federal judiciaries in this case. See infra notes 92-96.
44. Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 24-28.
45. Id. at 24.
46. Id. at 28-29.
47. Id at 29-30.
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tacked the constitutionality of the Texas supersedeas bond and lien

provisions 48 as applied to Texaco under the due process and supremacy
clauses.4 9

The Second Circuit's jurisdictional analysis proceeded on two levels.
First, the court concluded that the district court had impermissibly acted

as an appellate tribunal by hearing Texaco's five claims challenging the
Pennzoil rule and the procedural unfairness of the Texas litigation, in
violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5" Second, the court examined

whether the two remaining claims, challenging the application of Texas'
bond and lien provisions, stated a cause of action under section 1983 and
concluded that these claims were properly entertained by the district
CoUrt.51

This Part reviews the Second Circuit's jurisdictional analysis and proposes an alternative framework. First, it examines the origins and pur-

poses of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

After reviewing the Second

Circuit's application of Rooker-Feldman, this Part concludes that the
court frustrated the policies of that doctrine. Second, the state action
requirement is analyzed in light of the Supreme Court's concerns and the
purposes and policies of the Constitution and section 1983. With respect
48. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.001-.007 (Vernon 1984 & Supp.
1986).
49. See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 26-28, 29-30. The Second Circuit did
not dismiss Texaco's third and sixth claims. The third claim alleged that application of
the Texas bond and lien provisions to Texaco violates the supremacy clause, U.S. Const.
art. VI, cl.
2, by denying Texaco its right to appeal to the United States Supreme Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 26. The sixth
claim alleged that the challenged provisions violate the due process and equal protection
clauses. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. See id. at 29-30. Both of these claims were brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See id. at 6.
50. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1143 (2d Cir. 1986).
51. See id. at 1145-47. The court relied in part on the
extraordinary circumstances of this case... : a private civil money judgment in
an amount unprecedented in the annals of legal history, a clear inability on the
part of the judgment debtor to comply with a state law mandating a bond in the
full amount of the judgment pending appeal, the prospect that the state appellate court would not rule on the constitutionality of the state law before the
judgment creditor acted to enforce the judgment, and the likelihood that immediate enforcement of the Texas lien and bond provisions would lead to irreversible destruction of the debtor... thus robbing its right of appeal.
Id. at 1157.
Although these concerns are genuine and compelling, they ought not be part of the
jurisdictional inquiry. Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly rely on these "extraordinary circumstances" for its analysis of jurisdiction, the court based its entire decision, at least in part, on these circumstances. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133,
1157 (2d Cir. 1986). The precise effect these facts had on the court's decision is, however,
unknown. All that can be done, and all that this Part of the Comment attempts to do, is
to understand the court's analysis of the law, assess its validity and propose an alternative
approach. This Part concludes that the extenuating circumstances of this case cannot
create jurisdiction, regardless of how beneficial federal intervention might be. It does not
judge the Second Circuit's intentions nor the desirability of exercising jurisdiction under
these circumstances.

19861

TEXACO INC. v. PENNZOIL CO.

to state action this Part concludes that the Second Circuit unnecessarily
expanded the reach of the doctrine, thereby diminishing its utility.
A.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine rests on the precept that federal district
courts "possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court
decisions." 2 This rule stems from the interplay of two federal jurisdictional statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 s" and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1 Section 1331
grants district courts original jurisdiction over "civil actions arising
under" federal law."5 Section 1257 grants the Supreme Court the right to
review "final judgments ...rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had." 6 Because district courts may exercise
only original jurisdiction, it follows that they may not exercise the power
of appellate review over state or federal decisions. Moreover, section
1257 grants the Supreme Court the right to review state court decisions
on the federal level.57 This limit on the scope of federal district court
jurisdiction was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.5" and was later refined in District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman.5 9
1. Origins of the Doctrine
In Rooker, the Supreme Court, holding that it would be an impermissible exercise of appellate jurisdiction, refused to allow a federal district
court to nullify a judgment that had been affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Indiana.' The Court noted that, had the constitutional issues before
it been presented to the state trial court, the state court would have been
obligated to decide them.6" Further, if the state court decided these issues incorrectly, the proper course would be review at the state appellate
level and, eventually, in the United States Supreme Court.62 The rule
stated by the Court is that "no court of the United States other than this
52. Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
296 (1970); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84
(1983).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).

54. Id § 1331.
55. See 1d.
56. Id § 1257.
57. See id. Congress, by enacting § 1257, has granted the right to review state court
judgments to the Supreme Court. See id In no statute has Congress granted any other
federal court the right to review state court judgments. Because federal courts have no
jurisdiction unless it is granted by Congress, the Supreme Court's right to review state
court decisions is exclusive. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d
Cir. 1986).
58. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
59. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
60. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414-15.
61. See idt at 415.
62. See idt
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Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment
....
To do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction."63
In 1983 the Supreme Court breathed new life into Rooker in Districtof
Columbia Court of-Appeals v. Feldman.' In that case, the Committee on
Admissions of the District of Columbia Bar denied Feldman admission

although he was already a member of the bar in two neighboring states.
The Committee's decision was affirmed by the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals on the basis of a District of Columbia bar admission
rule requiring that applicants be graduates of an ABA-accredited law
school. 6 6 Subsequently, Feldman filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia alleging inter alia that the Court of
Appeals had denied him due process by "arbitrarily and capriciously"
denying him admission to the bar.67 On certiorari, the Supreme Court

dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.68

In so holding, the Court extended the rule in Rooker that a district
court cannot review state court judgments to encompass situations in
which "constitutional claims ... are inextricably intertwined" with the
state court's judgment. 69 The Court reasoned that in such instances "the
district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court
decision" and therefore has no jurisdiction.7" The Court focused its at-

tention on whether hearing the claim would engage the district court in
questioning the state court's decision instead of examining the effect review would have on the judgment. 7 1 At the heart of the doctrine lay the
63. See id, at 416.
64. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
65. See id. at 465-66. Instead of attending law school, Feldman participated in a
highly structured program of study, approved by the State of Virginia, in a practicing
attorney's office, and formally audited classes at the University of Virginia Law School.
In addition, after serving as a law clerk to a United States District Judge, Feldman was
admitted to the bars of Virginia and Maryland. See id. at 466.
66. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 468. Feldman, aware that District of Columbia's bar
admission rules inflexibly required graduation from an ABA-accredited law school, see
D.C. Court Rules 46I(b)(3) (current version of rule) (promulgated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals under authority granted by D.C. Code Ann. § 11-2501(a)
(1981)), petitioned the Court of Appeals to waive that requirement in light of his qualifications. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 466. The court refused his request, noting that the rule
was designed to prevent the Committee and the Court of Appeals from making individual
determinations of the qualifications of each applicant. See id. at 468.
67. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 468, 469 n.3. The court dismissed one of Feldman's
claims that alleged Rule 461(b)(3) violated his due process rights because it created an
irrebuttable presumption that only graduates of ABA-accredited law schools are qualified
for admission. See id. at 469 n.3. Feldman also alleged five additional causes of action
which, according to the Court, claimed that Rule 461(b)(3) violated the fifth amendment,
U.S. Const. amend. V, "'either on its face or as applied to [him].'" Feldman, 460 U.S. at
469 n.3 (quoting appellant's brief).
68. See id. at 482-83.
69. See id. at 476, 483 n.16.
70. Id. at 483-84 n.16.
71. See id. at 486. The Court stressed the distinction between a challenge to the
constitutionality of a rule as "promulgated" and as "applied." See id. at 485. Because
determining the constitutionality of a rule as promulgated does not require a federal court
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limited jurisdiction of federal district courts and the concerns of federalism and respect for state courts.
2.

Second Circuit's Application of Rooker-Feldman

The Second Circuit dismissed five of Texaco's seven claims on the basis of Rooker-Feldman. 2 The court recognized that, because all these
claims had been raised in the Texas trial court, deciding them would
require the district court to determine the correctness of the Texas
court's decision. 3 Such action would amount to reviewing claims "inextricably intertwined" with the Texas judgment and would be equivalent
to an impermissible appellate review under Feldman.7 4
The court also rejected Texaco's argument that Rooker-Feldman
should only preclude federal review of state court judgments that have
obtained appellate finality." In so doing, the court found three bases for
the doctrine: 1) the obligation and competence of state courts to decide
federal constitutional questions; 2) the availability of federal review of
state court decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States; and
to review a state court decision, a federal court may hear such a claim. See Razatos v.
Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433-33 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2019 (1985). Feldman bars only challenges to the application of a state rule to a
particular case because such an inquiry requires review of the state court's determination.
See Zimmerman v. Grievance Comm., 585 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 726
F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2681 (1984); Rosquist v. Jarrat Constr. Corp.,
570 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (D.NJ. 1983).
72. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1986).
73. See id. at 1143. Texaco raised its claim of procedural unfairness in Texas
through its motion to recuse Judge Farris. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d
1133, 1144 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986); Motion for Recusal or Disqualification, supra note 43. The
other four claims dismissed by the Second Circuit were also raised in Texas by Texaco's
motion for judgment n.o.v. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1144 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1986); Motion for Judgment N.O.V., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-05905
(Tex. Dist. CL Dec. 10, 1985).
74. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. The district court did not acknowledge Feldman's expansion of Rooker to preclude, not only direct review of state
court judgments, but also claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with that judgment.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Judge Brieant stated that the court was not
"attempting to sit as a final or intermediate appellate state court as to the merits of the
Texas action." Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, he proceeded
to criticize Texas' application of New York tort law and its assessment of punitive damages, as well as to recompute the compensatory damages that the Texas court had
awarded. See id, at 254-56.
Perhaps Judge Brieant reasoned that because he was not upsetting the Texas judgment,
but merely delaying its enforcement, he was not engaging in appellate review. But delaying enforcement of a judgment, even if only temporarily, is also an impermissible appellate review. See Kimball v. Florida Bar, 632 F.2d 1283, 1284 (5th Cir. 1980). The focus
of Rooker-Feldman is not the effect a district court's review will have on a state court
judgment, but rather whether that federal court must review the merits of a state court's
decision. See supra note 70. As the Second Circuit pointed out, the district court's conclusions on the merits of the Texas litigation "amount[ed] to an impermissible appellate
review." Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1143 (2d Cir. 1986).
75. See id. at 1142-43.
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3) the waste of judicial resources and creation of unnecessary friction
attributable to review of state court decisions by federal district courts.76
The Second Circuit reasoned that these concerns apply equally to district
court review of state trial and appellate court decisions.77
The Second Circuit found that the two remaining claims had not been

raised in the Texas litigation.7 The court rejected Pennzoil's argument

that Rooker-Feldman bars review of claims that could have been raised
in state court but were voluntarily withheld by the federal plaintiff.79 It

reasoned that such an interpretation of Rooker-Feldman would "severely
impair" the effectiveness of Section 1983 and "ignore Congress' purpose

in adopting that statute."' The court noted that section 1983 does not
require exhaustion of state remedies and allows concurrent state and federal jurisdiction.8 1

3. Analysis of the Second Circuit's Application of the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Second Circuit correctly dismissed the five Texaco claims that had
been previously raised in the Texas litigation 2 and the court's analysis
accurately reflected the federalism concerns embodied in the RookerFeldman doctrine.8 3 The claims were previously raised in Texas as defenses and, consequently, were "inextricably intertwined" with the state
court litigation because federal adjudication would have required federal
judicial review of the state court's decision. To avoid friction with the
76. See id. at 1142. The Second Circuit noted that the efficient operation of our dual
judicial system lies at the heart of Rooker-Feldman: "[Tlhis dual system could not function if state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular
case .... [Therefore] it [is] necessary to work out lines of demarcation between the two
systems." Id. at 1142 (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co.,
309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940)).
77. See id. at 1142.
78. See id. at 1144.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id. (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 506 (1982) and Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980)).
In addition, the Second Circuit observed that because Texaco had been an involuntary
party in the Texas forum, it could not be viewed as forum shopping. See id. at 1144.
This curious statement is superfluous to the court's reasoning. Texaco withheld its claims
from the Texas court in order to bring them in a federal court in White Plains, New
York, presumably because it perceived New York to be the friendlier forum.
That is not to say that the tactic should be criticized. Indeed, it was a brilliant litigation strategy, as the results indicate. In choosing White Plains as its forum, Texaco in
effect chose the judge, as Judge Brieant is the only federal judge who sits in White Plains.
More importantly, forum shopping is not an issue in determining jurisdiction, as it would
be, for instance, in applying the Erie doctrine. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938); see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (the twin aims of Erie are "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws"). Consequently, the court did not need to mention the question of forum shopping.
82. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
83. See supra Part I.A.1.
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state court, Feldman mandates that any review of those claims must necessarily be left to the Texas appellate courts and ultimately to the United
States Supreme Court. 84

In holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine inapplicable to Texaco's constitutional challenges to the bond and lien provisions, the Second Circuit
overlooked two important issues. First, the Supreme Court in Feldman
clearly indicated that "[b]y failing to raise his claims in state court a

plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state-court decision

in any federal court." ' The rationale of the Feldman Court was that
state courts must determine constitutional issues and ought to be given
the opportunity to interpret a state statute in a way rendering it constitutional."6 By choosing not to challenge the supersedeas bond and lien provisions in the Texas state court system, Texaco orchestrated the litigation
to circumvent the Rooker-Feldman limitation. 7 Strategic withholding of

claims could severely limit the application of Rooker-Feldman, a devel-

opment which would foster fragmented and protracted litigation. 8
Second, the Second Circuit's analysis violates the principles of comity
and federalism that underlie the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.8 9 The Sec-

ond Circuit decision offends the very principles it articulated as the basis

-for the doctrine.9"
The court here propounded not only what the Texas law is, but
surmised what the Texas courts would have decided in this particular
case with respect to the bond and lien provision challenge. 9 1 The Second

Circuit recognized that the supersedeas bond presents an insurmountable

hurdle to Texaco's appeal in Texas. 92 More importantly, applying the
84. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983);
see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923).
85. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983).
It is difficult to reconcile the Second Circuit's rejection of Pennzoil's argument, see supra
notes 84 and accompanying text, with the Supreme Court's explicit language in Feldman.
86. See id.

87. Texaco filed suit in federal court hours before the Texas court entered judgment.
See Pennzoil Brief, supra note 27, at 10. The claims Texaco raised in its federal complaint either had already been raised or could have been presented to the Texas court.
See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1143 (2d Cir. 1986). See infra note 98
and accompanying text. Because it chose instead to file suit in federal court, it is an
inescapable conclusion that Texaco preferred the federal forum.
88. For example, had Texaco been denied relief in federal court it could still have
petitioned the state court for relief. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.002(a) (Vernon Supp.
1986) (mandamus). The Texas courts would not be precluded from deciding the issue
because they could decide the constitutionality of the provisions under the Texas constitution. Therefore, by applying this rule federal courts effectively give plaintiffs two opportunities to litigate their claims, violating one of the principles of federalism. See
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286
(1970); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986).
89. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90. See id.

91. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1148 (2d Cir. 1986).
92. 1d, at 1138.
Based on Texaco's estimates, the worldwide surety bond capacity is between SL.0 bil-
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bond and lien provisions in this case likely violates the liberal "open
courts" provision of the Texas constitution.93 However, the Second Circuit assumed that the Texas courts either would not have recognized this
at all, or at least not in a timely manner. 94 Such an assumption is a
greater affront to state courts than the typical Rooker-Feldman scenario.

Instead of simply reviewing an actual Texas decision on the validity of
the challenged provisions, the court imputed a decision to the Texas judiciary and then reversed it.95 Such a decision causes unnecessary friction
between the state and federal judiciaries, violating one of the basic concerns of Rooker-Feldman.96
Further, hearing this case has wasted judicial resources. The Texas
trial court already had the case before it but was presented with no opportunity to determine the constitutional issue it would have been relion and $1.5 billion. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 88-89.
That the bond was beyond not only Texaco's means, but also beyond the worldwide
surety bond capacity, seemed an important distinction for the Second Circuit. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986). The significance of this
distinction, however, is not at all clear. If the worldwide bonding capacity were $12
billion, Texaco would still be unlikely able to post the bond because it would be unreasonable for all the surety bond firms in the world to place their resources at Texaco's disposal. One might query whether this would make the bond and lien provisions appear more
reasonable to the Second Circuit. The only difference between this situation and that of
any judgment debtor who cannot afford supersedeas is that Texaco is a large corporation
whose demise would cause widespread economic effects. Although Texaco's size may
raise policy concerns in its favor, the issue of whether a federal court has the power to
hear this case does not encompass whether Texaco ought to be protected.
93. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 13 (Vernon 1984); see also Brief of the State of Texas,
Intervenor-Appellant at 14-15, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.
1986). In Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1, 3, 14 S.W. 303, 305 (1890) (cited with
approval in Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1984)), the Texas Supreme
Court struck down a state statute conditioning the right to appeal on posting a supersedeas bond. The Second Circuit distinguished that statute from the bond and lien provisions in Texaco, reasoning that the bond in Dillingham was a condition to appeal whereas
the bond at issue in this case only conditioned supersedeas. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
784 F.2d 1133, 1148 n.12 (2d Cir. 1986). However, the Second Circuit also found that
the bond and lien provisions are probably offensive to the Constitution because they
would reduce Texaco's appeal in Texas to a "meaningless ritual." See id. at 1154 (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)). The Second Circuit cannot argue
that, for the purpose of the Texas constitution, the bond and lien provisions do not bar
Texaco's appeal, while maintaining that, for the purpose of the federal Constitution, the
rules effectively nullify Texaco's right to appeal.
94. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1150-51 (2d Cir. 1986).
95. See id. at 1148-49. The Second Circuit found that the Texas supersedeas provision requires, at a minimum, a bond in the full amount of the judgment plus interest, and
additionally, accords the trial judge no discretion in setting the amount of the bond for a
money judgment. See id. at 1147-49; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(b) (supersedeas bond
provision for money judgment).
96. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Even if the district court properly had
jurisdiction, generally "one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another [jurisdiction] ... already cognizant of the litigation,
have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204
(1950).
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quired to decide. 97 Similarly, the question could have been but was not
presented to the Texas appellate courts. 98 Instead, the issue was pursued
in two foreign courts while the Texas proceeding ground to a virtual
halt.99 The Second Circuit's decision in New York is applicable only to

the facts at hand. It does not clarify the Texas law for future application
or correct any possible defects. Eventually, this same issue may have to
be adjudicated by the Texas courts. This unnecessary duplication of efforts served no purpose other than to provide Texaco with what it perceived to be a friendly forum."°°
Finally, had Texaco proceeded with its plea in the Texas forum, federal review would have been available in the Supreme Court of the
United States.10 1 This opportunity satisfies the third basis articulated by
the Second Circuit for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.10 2

Consequently, the Second Circuit's refusal to apply Rooker-Feldman
to all of Texaco's constitutional claims may be questionable. Feldman
supports the conclusion that issues not raised in state court may be denied a federal forum altogether.10 3 Further, the principles articulated by

the court as the foundation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are equally
implicated by hearing the two permitted claims as by hearing the five
claims dismissed by the court. Moreover, applying the Second Circuit's
narrow application of the doctrine contravenes the Supreme Court's oft-

stated concern for federalism and respect for state courts.0'°
B.

The Section 1983 Claims

After finding that two of Texaco's Section 1983 claims survived
Rooker-Feldman analysis, the Second Circuit considered whether those
97. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1144, (2d Cir. 1986) (the third
and sixth claims were never raised in the Texas courts).
98. Had Texaco presented its constitutional claims to Judge Casseb and lost, it could
have directly petitioned the Texas Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of mandamus to
compel the trial court to reduce the bond. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.002(a)
(Vernon 1986). Arguably, this may have been an "extraordinary" remedy for abstention
purposes. But it was available if Texaco had genuinely wanted to appeal the judgment in
Texas. Moreover, mandamus may not be such an extraordinary remedy. See Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 62-63. See infra notes 361, 412 and accompanying
text
99. Although technically the case was active, only the motion for a new trial was
pending, and that motion was never heard by the court.
100. See supra note 81.
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). See text accompanying supra notes 56-57.
102. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (rejecting argument that
federal judges are more capable or willing to adjudicate constitutional issues in denial of
habeas corpus relief for fourth amendment violation); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 4344 (1971) (the "longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state
court proceedings" stems from "the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state
functions"); see also Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the FederalismSee-

saw, 25 Loy. L. Rev. 659, 660-61 (1979) (discussing the relation between § 1983 and
federalism).
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claims satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of a Section 1983 claim.,"

The court considered both elements of a Section 1983 claim,10 6 but focused on the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment be10 7
cause it was the dispositive jurisdictional inquiry in this case.

However, the court mechanically decided this question without due regard for the policies of the state action requirement, Section 1983 and the
fourteenth amendment. 108

1. Statutory Requirements and the State Action Standard
Section 1983 is not designed to redress every wrong. First, a plaintiff

must allege a deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right

and satisfy the requirements for that underlying claim. 0 9 Additionally,
a deprivation is not actionable
under Section 1983 unless it occurs
10

"under color of" state law.

In this case, the underlying claim was
2

based on the fourteenth amendment,"' which requires state action."

Because state action necessarily satisfies Section 1983's color of state law
requirement,"

3

the appropriate inquiry in Section 1983 cases premised

on the fourteenth amendment is whether the defendant's conduct constituted state action.
The law is clear that one need not be a state official to be subject to a
105. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1141-47 (2d Cir. 1986). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (1982) is the jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). In addition to
satisfying § 1343 however, Texaco needed to state adequately the elements of a § 1983
claim, including those of the underlying constitutional cause of action. See infra note 118
and accompanying text.
106. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145-47 (2d Cir. 1986).
107. See id. at 1145-47.
108. See id.
109. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); C.
Wright, supra note 40, § 22A, at 121-23. Section 1983 creates no rights. It only provides
a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Constitution and federal statutes that
provide civil rights. See C. Wright, supra note 40, § 22A, at 121.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
111. See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 29-30.
112. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-03 (1982); see Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
Because most constitutional protections apply to governmental actions-the thirteenth
amendment being the only exception, U.S. Const. amend. XIII-whenever a private individual is alleged to have violated the civil rights of another the court must determine
whether the defendant's actions constitute "state" action. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda &
J. Young, Constitutional Law 497 (2d ed. 1983); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
§ 18-1, at 1147 & n.1 (1978). See infra Part I.B.3.
113. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930-32 (1982); see Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). Although the color of state law requirement and
the constitutional doctrine of state action are not coextensive, they are clearly related.
Lugar,457 U.S. at 928. The Supreme Court has said, on at least one occasion, that the
two concepts are identical. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). The
better view, however, is that when a § 1983 defendant is a private party acting alone, or a
public official acting within the scope of his or her duty, the two inquiries collapse into
one. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928 n.8 (accepting this view as expressed by the lower court
in that case). A distinction arises only when the challenged conduct involves joint action
by private and public parties. Id.
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Section 1983 suit.1 4 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of when
private conduct becomes state action in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 5
In Lugar, the Edmonson Oil Company sued Lugar to recover a
debt. " 6 Pursuant to Virginia law, Edmondson sought a pre-judgment
attachment of Lugar's property by means of an ex parte petition."' The
court clerk, relying solely on the allegations in the petition, issued a writ

of attachment, which the county sheriff executed."

The trial judge dis-

missed the attachment when Edmondson failed to substantiate the allegations of the petition at the post-attachment hearing."19 Lugar then
sued Edmondson under Section 1983, alleging a deprivation of property
without due process of law. 20 On certiorari, the Supreme Court held
that Edmondson's conduct under the state pre-judgment attachment

statute was state action sufficient to satisfy the color of state law requirement. ' In so doing, the Court articulated a two step analysis for determining when a private action ought to be considered state action:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.... Second, the
party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be
22
said to be a state actor.1

2.

Application of the Standard by the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit found that Texaco's allegations clearly stated a
threatened deprivation of its right to appeal to a state appellate court as
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
to the United States Supreme Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1257.11 The court
114. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (complaint
stated a valid § 1983 cause of action against a private oil supplier); Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U.S. 24, 26, 27-28 (1980) (plaintiff stated a valid § 1983 claim against private parties who
had induced judge improperly to issue an injunction); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 149, 152 (1970) (proper § 1983 claim stated against restaurant owner who refused to serve white plaintiff seated with blacks).
115. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
116. Id at 924.
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id at 925.
120. Id
121. See id at 942.
122. Id at 937.

123. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986). If Pennzoil
had deprived Texaco of its right to appeal, a deprivation would have taken place. However, there has been only a potential deprivation because Texaco never attempted to set
the amount of the bond in Texas. Moreover, if a deprivation had occurred, Texas, not
Pennzoil, would be responsible for it. The challenged provisions were enacted by the
Texas Supreme Court and a Texas official would have approved the amount of the bond.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(a); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.004 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Therefore, had Texaco sued Texas or the officials charged with enforcing the bond and lien
provisions, there would be no doubt as to the deprivation. More important, there would
be no state action issue because conduct by Texas officials necessarily would be state
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proceeded to decide whether Pennzoil's conduct
was state action by ap24
plying the two part test set out in Lugar.1
By invoking the bond and lien provisions, 125 Pennzoil would exercise a
"right or privilege created by the State."1 26 Consequently, the Second
Circuit found that Texaco had easily satisfied the first requirement of
Lugar.127 While acknowledging that it was the more difficult question,
the court also held that Pennzoil could "fairly be said
to be a state ac12 s
tor," thereby satisfying the second prong of Lugar.

The court based the latter conclusion on two facts. First, Pennzoil
would necessarily invoke the aid of state officials in order to enforce the
judgment. 129 Second, the court found that Pennzoil, not the State of
30
Texas, would make the ultimate decision to enforce the judgment.
The Second Circuit focused its inquiry on the concerted action of
Pennzoil and state officials.1 31 The court found that the "panoply of activities undertaken together by Pennzoil and state officials" was sufficient
to constitute state action. 1 32 Judge Mansfield, writing for a unanimous
panel, found these facts indistinguishable from Lugar because the plaintiff in that case had also invoked the aid of state officials and the decision
action. See infra note 134. One reason Texaco decided against suing Texas officials may
have been to avoid antagonizing the Texas courts. Another possible explanation is that
venue would have been proper only in Texas federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
(1982) (venue exists only where "all defendants reside, or [where] the claim arose").
In finding, without discussion, that Texaco had alleged a sufficient deprivation to state
a cause of action under § 1983, the Second Circuit implicitly assumed that Texaco would
have found no relief in the Texas courts and would have been required to post a bond that
could not be posted. See supra note 92. However, this assumption may not be correct.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 365(b) (appellate court may reduce amount of bond if excessive); Tex.
Gov't Code Ann. § 22.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (supreme court may issue writ of
mandamus to compel compliance with state law). See supra note 93 and accompanying
text.
124. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145-47 (2d Cir. 1986).
125. Tex. R. Civ. P. 364(a)-(b); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 52.001-.007 (Vernon 1984).
126. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (1982)).
127. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (1982); see Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133,
1145 (2d Cir. 1986).
128. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145, 1147 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Lugar,457 U.S. at 937 (1982)).
129. Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1145-46.
130. See id. at 1147. Under Texas procedure, the judgment would have become enforceable 30 days after denial of Texaco's motion for a new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
329(c), (e), (f). To enforce the judgment, Pennzoil would have had to present an abstract
of the judgment to the court clerk, who would then issue a writ of execution. See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 622, 629. The county sheriff would then seize Texaco's property. See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 630.
131. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986).
132. See id. By focusing on the "panoply of activities," id., by Pennzoil and Texas
officials the Second Circuit engaged in the "single-minded search for the moving hand of
governmental actor." See L. Tribe, supra note 112, at 105 (Supp. 1979). This search, as
Professor Tribe argues, does not address the real issue of the state action analysis-how
state rules allocate power between governmental and private parties. See id. § 18-5, at
1162 (1978).
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to attach was unilaterally made by the private party.'3 3
3.

A Proposed State Action Analysis

The Second Circuit's mechanical application of the Lugar test did not
consider important principles underlying the state action analysis. When
determining whether a private party is a state actor, both the purposes of
the state action inquiry and the policies134
behind Lugar ought to be considered in addition to the two prong test.
The fourteenth amendment protects individuals from deprivations of
federal rights by state governments.135 This protection is necessary because governmental acts carried out with the full force and authority of
the state present greater potential for constitutional deprivations than

purely private acts. 136 To provide this protection, the Constitution imposes limits on the exercise of governmental power. Therefore, the state

action inquiry should focus on whether the nature of
the power that
37

caused the alleged deprivation is in fact state power.'
State power may be divided into two components. The first is the authority to regulate conduct by making laws. The first prong of the Lugar
test incorporates this component by focusing on the state rule pursuant
to which the private party acts.' 38 When a private party acts pursuant to
a state law or rule of conduct, however, it is not necessarily acting as the
133. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986). The difference between the two procedures is that the ex parte petition in Lugar consisted only of
the allegations of one party, whereas the ex parte petition in Texas is the judgment itself,
which in this instance is the decision of a Texas court, arrived at after a four and one-half
month jury trial. This ought to be an important distinction in determining state action.
See infra Part I.B.2.
134. The state action analysis set forth below only applies to cases where the § 1983
defendant is a private party acting with official involvement. When the defendant is a
state official state action is obvious. When the defendant is a purely private party, the
Supreme Court has outlined various tests to determine whether the private party may be
considered a state actor. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 112, at 50225.
135. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974) (fourteenth
amendment offers no shield against private conduct); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948) (same); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("Individual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [fourteenth] amendment."). Some commentators maintain that the fourteenth amendment's framers intended to guarantee the
substantive rights granted in the Bill of Rights. See I. Brant, The Bill of Rights 341-42
(1965); H. Meyer, The Amendment That Refused to Die 59 (1973); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1332-33 (1952). The

actual intent of the framers is likely unfathomable and not critical since the fourteenth
amendment today is interpreted as providing substantive protections under the doctrine
of "incorporation." See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 112, at 443.
136. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 112, at 414-15; Developments
in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1153-56 (1977) (discuss-

ing the atrocities committed by the Ku Klux Klan with the support of the southern
states).
137. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (when private parties are endowed
with governmental powers they are subject to constitutional limitations).
138. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (acting pursuant to a
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state.' 39 The state involvement in such action is passive-the state
merely refrains from proscribing the conduct.140 Therefore, although the
private party acts with the consent of the government it does not have
the affirmative support necessary for state action. 141
The second component of state power is the authority to enforce a
state rule or law. 142 This aspect of state power is affirmative. The state
43
not only consents to but lends its enforcement power to the conduct.1
Such affirmative support of private acts has been present in every case in
which the Supreme Court held that private conduct constituted state action.'" Moreover, in addition to affirmatively supporting the private
conduct, the state permits the private party to make the decision to employ the state's enforcement powers. Therefore, courts ought not focus
on the involvement of state officials, but rather on the extent to which the
state cedes its enforcement power to a private party. 145
The Third Circuit embraced this approach to the state action analysis
in Cruz v. Donnelly,146 holding that a store manager who had the plaintiff
state law or rule is not enough to convert private conduct into state action). See supra
note 122 and accompanying text.
139. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
164-65 (1978); Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1845 (1985).
140. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978).
141. Compare id. at 165 (mere consent by the state, even in statutory form, does not
provide the "encouragement" necessary for state action) with Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982) (defective procedural scheme will be subject to constitutional restraint if the state aids the private party in enforcing it).
142. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972) (state enforcement
of private party's discriminatory policy converts otherwise private action into state
action).
143. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170-71 (1970) (equal protection violated if state enforces custom of segregation in public places).
144. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975)
(state-enforced pre-judgment attachment mechanism requires procedural safeguards);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972) (state-enforced pre-judgment attachment
and replevin procedure held unconstitutional); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 341-42 (1969) (state-enforced pre-judgment wage garnishment procedure found to
violate fourteenth amendment in action against private party).
145. Cf L. Tribe, supra note 112, at 105 (Supp. 1979). Professor Tribe has recast the
state action inquiry in terms of distribution of authority between governmental and private actors. He argues that when a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a state rule
rather than the conduct of a state official, the proper inquiry is "whether the challenged
... rule of law can validly distribute authority among governmental and private actors as
it purports to do." Id. This framework, although more generalized, can encompass the
foregoing articulation of the appropriate state action inquiry where a private party acts
with the aid of state officials. It is also important to note that the analysis proposed by
this Comment does not focus on whether the state has delegated a sovereign function. As
Professor Tribe points out, such an inquiry enmeshes the court in a determination of
what is a sovereign function. See id. at 108-09. This inquiry is, however, imprecise. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1008 (1984) (defining a governmental function is a difficult task).
146. 727 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see also Fishman v. De Meo, 590 F.
Supp. 402, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Jones v. Eagleville Hosp. & Rehab. Center, 588 F. Supp.
53, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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detained and strip-searched by the police was not a state actor under
Lugar.47 The Third Circuit interpreted Lugar to emphasize the reliance
pre-judgment attachment places on the judgment of the private party. 4 "
The court concluded that "when the state creates a system permitting

private parties to substitute their judgment for that of a state official or
body, a private actor's mere invocation of state power renders that
party's conduct actionable under § 1983."" 9
The facts of Texaco resemble Cruz more than Lugar in that the chal-

lenged Texas provisions did not involve a pre-judgment attachment.
Rather, the decision on the need for the judgment was made by a Texas
court after a four and one-half month jury trial. Although Pennzoil will

decide when to enforce the judgement, it has not substituted its discretion
for that of the state in deciding whether to award the judgment.'
If the
Second Circuit is correct that merely invoking the aid of state officials

constitutes state action, then every judgment creditor becomes a state
actor, exposing private parties to virtually limitless constitutional litiga" ' This could not have
tion. 15
been intended by the Lugar Court.'
Giving state action such an interpretation strips it of any import whatever.
Indeed, if a private party becomes a state actor every time he invokes the
aid of a state official, the state action inquiry becomes meaningless.
Although the Second Circuit strained to limit the reach of its decision to
the "extraordinary circumstances of this case,"' 53 its mechanical analysis
of state action can do nothing but further blur the boundaries of this
already imprecise constitutional doctrine.' 5 4
147. See Cruz, 727 F.2d at 80, 82. Employees of an A & P store called the police after
Cruz had aroused their suspicions. The police brought Cruz into the manager's office,
where the store manager allegedly accused Cruz of shoplifting and ordered the officers to
conduct a search. See id at 80 (quoting Complaint 9).
148. See iL at 81-82. The court found that the police had exercised independent discretion in investigating the crime and had not acted pursuant to a prearranged plan.
Therefore, the court held the manager was not a state actor. See id.
149. See id at 82.
150. The Second Circuit seemed to acknowledge that whether the state or the private
party makes a decision is relevant to the state action inquiry. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1147 (2d Cir. 1986). The court, however, focused on the wrong
decision. The Second Circuit found the relevant exercise of discretion was the decision of
when to enforce the judgment. See iL But if the judgment is offensive, the relevant
decision is whether there ought to have been a judgment at all. This decision was made
by the state of Texas through its trial court. Moreover, the trial court decided the timing
of enforcement, at least to a certain extent, in the much disputed paragraph 7 of the
judgment, which forbade Pennzoil from executing the judgment for as long as the trial
court retained jurisdiction. See supra note 20.
151. Recognizing this potential, the courts have held that mere invocation of legal
procedures does not constitute state action. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980);
Hinman v. Lincoln Towing Serv., cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 1845 (1985) 771 F.2d 189, 193
(7th Cir. 1985); Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
152. See Lugar,457 U.S. at 937 (unless action is "chargeable to the State[,] ... private
parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule
governing their interactions with the community surrounding them").
153. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986).
154. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("[T]o fashion
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In sum, both Section 1983's purposes as well as the Lugar Court's
concerns, suggest that the state action inquiry should focus on whether
the private party has its judgment substituted for that of the state in determining whether to employ the state's enforcement power to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights."' Because in this case the state of
Texas did not substitute Pennzoil's discretion for its own in awarding the
judgment, Pennzoil ought not "fairly be said to be a state actor.' ' 156 Consequently, the federal court should not have asserted jurisdiction under
sections 1983 and 1343 to hear this case.
C. Summary
The circumstances of this case were indeed "extraordinary." '5 7
Although these facts may provide good reason for a federal court to desire to intervene, a federal court cannot decide to hear a case because
public policy would seem to favor it. Rather, federal courts have power
to decide only cases that Congress expressly authorizes. Hearing this
case not only violates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but also extends the
scope of private conduct that constitutes state action beyond the
Supreme Court's intent. If the Second Circuit's jurisdictional analysis
was affected by the "extraordinary circumstances" of this case, it would
have provided more guidance to future courts by addressing these concerns more openly. Instead, by trying to justify a possibly result-oriented
decision on technical grounds, the court blurred subtle distinctions in
important constitutional doctrines.
and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the [fourteenth
amendment] is an 'impossible task.' ").
155. See Cruz, 727 F.2d at 82. The district court relied heavily on Henry v. First Nat'l
Bank, 595 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1979), in granting Texaco injunctive relief. This case, however, can be distinguished on two grounds. First, the state money judgment at issue in
Henry was "essentially based on [an] underlying injunction" that was "at odds with the
First Amendment." Id. at 299. Second, that case was decided three years before Lugar.
The Fifth Circuit found state action in Henry because the defendant possessed an immediately enforceable judgment. Id. at 299. Based on the foregoing analysis this conclusion
would have been different after Lugar. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
156. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
157. Texaco alleged that it had suffered painful economic effects. It had difficulty obtaining financing from its usual sources because of the Texas judgment and the uncertainty surrounding the bond requirement; partners had abandoned plans for joint
ventures; and Moody's and Standard & Poor's had downgraded Texaco's securities, effectively keeping Texaco out of the credit market. Texaco Brief, supra note 12, at 2. Moreover, if Texaco had gone bankrupt, the economic effects would have reverberated
throughout the national economy. See Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 20-22. In
fact, 12 states filed amicus curiae briefs with the Second Circuit describing the economic
devastation a collapse of Texaco would cause. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d
1133, 1136 (2d Cir. 1986). These fears were not unfounded. Texaco is the fifth largest
corporation in the United States. Fortune, April 29, 1985, at 266. It employs 55,000
people around the world, and is an important supplier of fuel for United States armed
forces. Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 6. In light of these facts, it is evident that the
financial collapse of Texaco should have been avoided if at all possible.
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II.

APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION

ACT

By affirming jurisdiction under Section 1983, the Second Circuit determined that a federal court has the power to hear a challenge to state
court procedure arising out of an ongoing state proceeding. The finding
of Section 1983 jurisdiction also meant that the Anti-Injunction Act' 8
did not bar the injunctive relief requested by Texaco. The Second Circuit's decision gave only brief consideration to this statutory barrier '
because established interpretation categorically exempts Section 1983
6°
claims from the Act's ban on injunctions of state court proceedings.1
Instead, federal courts rely on the judge-made Younger doctrine to determine the propriety of such injunctions.' 6' This Part argues that the current approach to the Act fosters inconsistent judicial decisions and
frustrates legitimate congressional goals. The Second Circuit's decision
illustrates the malleability of Anti-Injunction Act analysis and the consequent potential for contrived results.
The current anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides that
"[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments."' 6 2 The simple language belies the tortuous
path of judicial interpretations that led to the present version.
To better understand how the present approach to the Act evolved, it
will first be necessary to consider the history of the statute prior to
Mitchum v. Foster,'6 3 the 1972 decision that established Section 1983 as
an expressly authorized exception to Section 2283.'" Next, a brief survey of the conflicting developments since Mitchum---contraction of Section 1983 jurisdiction and expansion of the reach of the Younger
doctrine-will be offered. The inconsistency of these two developments
with Mitchum will be viewed in light of other recent federalism decisions.
The conclusions of this analysis 65will in turn be applied to the issues raised
in Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.1
A. HistoricalDevelopment of the Anti-Injunction Act
1. Early History
The source of the current Anti-Injunction Act can be traced to a sen158. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
159. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1147 (2d Cir. 1986). The district

court opinion also gave short shrift to the Anti-Injunction Act. See Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 259 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 784 F.2d

1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
160. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).

163. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
164. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.

165. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
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tence in the 1793 amendment to the Judiciary Act, 66 the intent and purpose of which is unclear. 167 The few early decisions involving federal

injunctions of state court proceedings were not definitive.

68

In 1872,

however, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act as an absolute bar to

federal injunctions of state proceedings. 169 In the 1874 recodification,

166. "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state." Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1982)); see, e.g., Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 631 (1977) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (tracing current anti-injunction act to clause in the 1793
statute); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (same); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 282-83 (1970) (same).
167. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232-33 & n.10 (1972); Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130-31 (1941); Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against
Proceedingsin State Courts: The Life History ofa Statute, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1145 &
n.3 (1932); Taylor & Willis, The Power ofFederal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State
Courts, 42 Yale L.J. 1169, 1170 (1933).
Some twentieth century Supreme Court opinions have contended that regardless of the
motivation for the original statute, the meaning is clear on its face: "nor shall a writ of
injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793,
ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)); see Mitchum, 407
U.S. at 231-33; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971); Toucey, 314 U.S. at 132.
Recent commentators have argued persuasively that this language has been taken out
of context. In fact, they contend, the clause was originally targeted only at individual
Supreme Court Justices, and the intent-far from being to set forth a broad dictate of
federalism-was part of an effort to ease the burdensome circuit riding duties of the justices. See Mayton, Ersatz Federalism under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 330, 332-33 (1978); Reaves & Golden, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute in the
Aftermath of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 5 Ga. L. Rev. 294, 296-99 (1971); see also
Taylor & Willis, supra, at 1170 (attributing historical source of the Act to a letter from
Supreme Court Justices complaining of circuit riding duties rather than to any intent to
limit federal court jurisdiction). The position that the clause was not intended to bar all
federal court intervention in state proceedings is supported by the availability and use of
other writs to effect stays of state proceedings at that time. See Mayton, supra, at 336-37;
Note, Federal CourtStays ofState Court Proceedings: A Re-examination of Original CongressionalIntent, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 612, 613-14, 624 (1971) (discussing Congress' awareness of the availability and use of other writs and concluding that Congress did not intend
to prohibit these other forms of effecting stays of state court proceedings).
168. See Mayton, supra note 167, at 338-44 (early federal courts did stay state court
proceedings; when federal courts refused to stay such proceedings, they did so without
reference to the 1793 statute); Reaves & Golden, supra note 167, at 297-98 (Supreme
Court's early decisions did not rely on the 1793 Act when refusing to stay state court
proceedings, which implies that anti-injunction clause applied only to individual Justices
rather than to federal courts generally); Taylor & Willis, supra note 167, at 1172 n.21
(noting infrequency of decisions applying the statute). See also infra note 169.
169. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 719 (1872). But see Mayton, supra
note 167, at 346 (discussing lack of support for view that the 1793 statute was intended to
bar injunctions of state proceedings); Reaves & Golden, supra note 167, at 297-99 (discussing lack of precedent for Court's decision); Warren, Federaland State CourtInterference, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 366-67 (1930) (stating that no decisions were expressly based
on the statute from 1807 to 1872). In a lengthy opinion the Court's only reference to the
statute was to state that "the act of Congress of March 2d, 1793, as construed in the cases
of Diggs v. Wolcott, and Peck v. Jenness, are equally conclusive against any injunction
from the Circuit Court ......
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 719 (1872)
(footnotes omitted).
Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807), a case often relied on as the
first instance of the anti-injunction clause, was a one-sentence decision that did not men-
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the language
of the 1793 statute was changed to reflect such an absolute
170

ban.'

Despite the revision's seemingly unambiguous language, federal courts
established broad statutory and judicial exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act in the decades that followed. 7 ' However, in Toucey v. New York
Life Insurance Co.,' 72 Justice Frankfurter departed sharply from prior
interpretations,173 finding the Act to be a clear-cut prohibition of federal
court injunctions of state court proceedings. Justice Frankfurter attacked the implied exceptions to the anti-injunction statute as inconsistent with Congress' intent."7 4 He explicitly based his strict interpretation
on Congress' desire to avoid friction between federal and state courts by
preventing interference in state judicial proceedings.'
tion the 1793 statute. See Mayton, supra note 167, at 340 (stating that the briefs and
records on appeal also contained no mention of the statute, and that contemporary commentators interpreted the basis of the decision to be comity, not the statute).
Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 611 (1849), was a bankruptcy case in which the
Supreme Court affirmed a New Hampshire Supreme Court decision holding a federal
injunction to be barred by the 1793 statute. Again, the sole authority for this decision
was Diggs & Keith. See id at 625.
170. See Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 12, § 720, 18 Stat. 134, 136 (1st ed.). The Act
excepted bankruptcy from its scope. Id Otherwise, the codification was apparently not
intended to change existing law. By separating the anti-injunction clause from the balance of the statute and adding the language "by any court of the United States," the
original application only to individual Supreme Court Justices was lost. See Mayton,
supra note 167, at 346 & nn.99-100; Reaves & Golden, supra note 167, at 298-99. The
revision cited Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807), Peck v. Jenness,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 612 (1849), Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872), and two
later cases as authorities. See Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 12, § 720, 18 Stat. 134, 136
(1st ed.) (Reviser's Notes). See supra note 169 for a discussion of the cases.
The statute was later recodified without any change in the language. Act of March 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162.
171. The Court in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), enumerated
some of the exceptigns. The Court found one express statutory exception (the bankruptcy act), four imilied statutory exceptions (concerning removal, shipowner's liability,
interpleader and farm foreclosures) and judge-made exceptions (involving relitigationthe only exception a6tually before the Court-attachment of a res and judgments fraudulently obtained in state court). See id. at 132-36.
One of the commentaries on which the Court in Toucey relied, see id. at 131, suggested
two additional exceptions in the case law-actions to test the constitutionality of state
statutes and injunctions sought by the United States government. Taylor & Willis, supra
note 167, at 1190-94. The latter exception has since been accepted by the Court. See
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 227-28 (1957).
Other commentators writing prior to Toucey found that the exceptions to the AntiInjunction Act were so entrenched that, for practical purposes, "the statute has long been
dead." Durfee & Sloss, supra note 167, at 1169.
172. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
173. See ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts
§ 1372, at 299 (1969); D. Currie, Federal Courts 701 (3d ed. 1982); Mayton, supra note
167, at 349.
174. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139-41 (1941).
175. See id. at 135 ("The Act of 1793 expresses the desire of Congress to avoid friction
between the federal government and the states resulting from the intrusion of federal
authority into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process."); see also Oklahoma
Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1939) (describing the Act as
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Congress responded to Toucey by enacting the present version of the
anti-injunction statute in 1948. 176 Aside from restoring the specific relitigation exception that Toucey had rejected, the revised statute did little to
clarify the ambiguity of its predecessors. 7 7 Nonetheless Frankfurter, interpreting the revised statute in a later decision, found "a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions."'"" The policy
Frankfurter relied on for this interpretation was what he perceived as
Congress' "historic prohibition
against federal interference with state ju'7 9
dicial proceedings."'
Following Justice Frankfurter's lead, the Court continued to interpret
the prohibition broadly and construe the exceptions narrowly in the decade that followed. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroadv. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 0 Justice Black maintained that the source of the
original anti-injunction statute was the need to avoid friction within the
dual legal system.' 8 ' This view implied that more than just the language
of the Anti-Injunction Act itself barred federal court interference in state
court proceedings. In contrast to earlier decisions, which relied solely on
congressional intent in striking down federal injunctions of state proceed"a limitation of the power of the federal courts dating almost from the beginning of our
history and expressing an important Congressional policy-to prevent needless friction
between state and federal courts").
176. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982)).
177. The revisers stated that "the revised section restores the basic law as generally
understood . . . prior to the Toucey decision." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (Historical &
Revision Notes). It is unclear whether Congress thereby intended to restore all of the
pre-Toucey exceptions, or just the relitigation exception at issue in the case. See Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 236 (1972) (Congress intended to restore the law as it was before
Toucey); Mayton, supra note 167, at 349-50 (same); Reaves & Golden, supra note 167, at
303-05 (suggesting that the matter is uncertain); Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717, 722 (1977) (suggesting that both the language and the
intent of Congress are uncertain) [hereinafter cited as Redish I]. But see Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 515 n.1 (1955) ("the quoted phrase
[from the Reviser's Note] refers only to the particular problem which was before the
Court in the Toucey case").
178. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955).
But see id. at 523 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he express purpose of § 2283 was to
contract-not expand-the prohibition of § 265.... To read § 2283 literally ... ignores
not only this legislative history but also over a century of judicial history.").
179. Id. at 514. This view was essentially the same view that Frankfurter had expressed in Toucey, 314 U.S. at 135, the case Congress overruled by name. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1982) (Historical & Revision Notes).
180. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
181. See id. at 286. Based on this interpretation of the statute's history, Black concluded that
any injunction against state court proceedings ... must be based on one of the
specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 if it is to be upheld. Moreover since the
statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental
constitutional independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions
should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction.
Id. at 287.
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ings,"'8 Black implied that the nature of the dual judicial system itself
required that federal courts not interfere. Black's invocation of "the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts"' 8 3
to limit federal injunctive power reappeared in his doctrine of "Our Federalism" articulated the following year in Younger v. Harris.
In Younger, Justice Black began by characterizing the Act as an unambiguous ban on federal court interference since its inception in 1793.185
This assertion was made even though the source and intent of the original Act have never been certain and in actual practice the statute has
seldom been interpreted as an absolute ban.' 86 Nonetheless, Black went
on to identify the two policies he claimed underlay the Act. First, equity
required irreparable harm and no adequate remedy at law. 18 7 Second
was the more vital consideration--comity 8 8 He found that comity
required
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are8 9 left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.1
182. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
183. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
287 (1970).
184. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The substantive elements of what has become known as the
Younger doctrine and the Second Circuit's application of the doctrine will be discussed in
Part III of this Comment.
185. Black stated:
Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few
exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from
interference by federal courts. In 1793 an Act unconditionally provided: 'IN]or
shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state
.... ' I Stat. 335, c. 22, § 5. A comparison of the 1793 Act with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, its present-day successor, graphically illustrates how few and minor
have been the exceptions granted from the flat, prohibitory language of the old
Act.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
It has been noted that Justice Black's opinion "disregard[s] such intervening events as
the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Act [and] the federal jurisdictional grants of the Reconstruction era." Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 Suffolk U.L. Rev.
1087, 1104 (1978).
186. See supra notes 167-72. Black relied on Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 118 (1941), for this version of the statute's history. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 n.3.
As authority, Toucey is vulnerable to criticism both because it represented such a sharp
break from past Supreme Court interpretations and because Congress expressly overruled
it. See supra notes 172-79. Commentators writing since Toucey have challenged the accuracy of its view of the Anti-Injunction Act's history. Much of the research regarding
the context of the original anti-injunction clause has occurred since then. See Mayton,
supra note 167, at 332-38; Reaves & Golden, supra note 167, at 294-99. See generally
supra notes 167-69.
187. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
188. See ic at 44.

189. Id
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Based on this view of federalism, the Court overturned the federally-is-

sued injunction in Younger without reaching the question of whether
Section 1983 was an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.' 90

By relying on comity, equity and federalism rather than on the antiinjunction statute, the Court in Younger essentially freed itself from Congress' intent as to the circumstances, if any, under which federal courts
could enjoin state court proceedings.' 9' Henceforth, the Court could
overturn federal court injunctions based on free-standing notions of comity, even though the injunctions involved exceptions to the Act expressly
authorized by Congress. 1 92 Only against this background can the limits
of the Mitchum decision be understood.
2.

Mitchum v. Foster

Mitchum v. Foster,193 a case involving a federal court injunction of a
state nuisance action, 194 stands for the proposition that Section 1983 is
an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute. 95
Justice Stewart surveyed the statutes previously determined to be congressionally authorized exceptions to Section 2283.196 From these excep-

tions he derived the following test: "whether an Act of Congress...
190. Five other cases involving federal court intervention in state criminal court pro-

ceedings were decided along with Younger. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
191. See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm.&
Mary L. Rev. 605, 620 (1981) (noting that Younger's judge-made barrier to federal injunctions functionally replaced Congress' statutory intent so that "Mitchum v. Fosterhad
its fangs pulled even before it was announced"); Mayton, supra note 167, at 351 n. 132
(noting that Younger effectively eviscerated the exceptions to the Act in civil rights cases);
Redish, Abstention, Separationof Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 Yale
L.J. 71, 88 (1984) ("if Mitchum is valid, Younger abstention represents an effective reversal of the congressional decision to make section 1983 an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act") [hereinafter cited as Redish II].
192. See Field, The UncertainNature of FederalJurisdiction,22 Wm.& Mary L. Rev.
683, 703-04 (1981) ("It is strange, to say the least, that the exceptions to a statute should

be interpreted to yield exactly the same results as the statute itself and also that 'the
policy of the Act' can accomplish this both for the Act and its exceptions without identification of what that policy is.") [hereinafter cited as Field I]; Redish II, supra note 191, at
86 ("In Younger, the Court found the injunction improper, purely as a matter of judgemade principles. It expressly declined to consider whether the injunction was barred by
the Anti-Injunction Act."); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference
With State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits ofJudicialDiscretion,
53 N.C.L. Rev. 591, 650-51 (1975) (noting incongruity of relying on Anti-Injunction Act

to support judicial policy of banning injunctions when the Act expressly excepted the
actions).
193. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
194. See id. at 227.
195. See id. at 242-43; see also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 n.8 (1977)
(relying on Mitchum as authority for the proposition that § 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to § 2283); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600 n.15 (1975) (same).

196. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234-38 & nn.12-24 (1972).
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could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."' 9 7 Applying the test to Section 1983, the Mitchum Court concluded that Congress intended the statute to enshrine the federal courts
as guardians of the people against unconstitutional state action, including

actions of state courts.198

The Court thus determined that Congress did not intend the Act to

bar federal court injunctions in Section 1983 cases. However, the Court
emphasized that the Younger doctrine might still do so.19 9 In essence the

Court's holding meant that Congress' intent to make federal court injunctions against state proceedings available to Section 1983 plaintiffs
could be circumvented by the Court under the Younger doctrine." The
authority for the Court's position again derived from the purported intent of Congress in enacting the 1793 statute to protect the dual legal
system by barring injunctions."'
3.

Developments since Mitchum v. Foster

Two developments since the Mitchum decision have intensified the
clash between the view in Mitchum that Congress intended federal courts

to be able to enjoin state courts in Section 1983 actions and the view in
Younger that principles of federalism generally bar federal court injunc-

tions of state court proceedings. First, Supreme Court decisions since
1972 have retreated from Mitchum's broad interventionist interpretation

of Section 1983. Recent decisions have limited the scope of Section 1983
197. See id.at 238; see also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 632 (1977)
(plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (applying Mitchum test to federal antitrust law).
198. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242 ("The very purpose of section 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's
federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' ") (quoting Ex pane Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
For an exhaustive examination of the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment
and the predecessor to § 1983 that supports the Mitchum Court's interventionist view,
see Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrinein Light of the Legislative History of
Reconstruction, 1983 Duke L.J. 987.
199. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243. The concurring opinion was solely concerned with
the importance of applying Younger to the cases. See id. at 243-44 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring).
200. See supra note 191.
201. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971); see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 335 n. 11 (1977) (overturning a federal court injunction based on "the applicability,
wholly independent of a statutory codification, of the longstanding policies which inhere
in the notions of comity and federalism").
The circularity of the Younger opinion-relying on an obscure clause in a 1793 statute
to support abstaining from enforcing the subsequently-enacted Civil Rights Act of
1871-has been pointed out. See Redish I, supra note 177, at 738; Whitten, supra note
192, at 673. Arguments that the conditions that led to the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 no longer concern Congress do not resolve this problem because Congress
has more recently recodified § 1983 than it has the Anti-Injunction Act. See Redish I,
supra note 177, at 738 n.100.
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by narrowly interpreting the deprivation2 ' 2 and "under color of state
law"2 "3 elements, while expanding doctrines of immunity. 2 4 These decisions depreciate the importance of Section 1983, thereby undercutting
Mitchum's vitality.2 0 5
Second, the Younger doctrine is no longer limited to its original context of criminal cases.2 °6 At a minimum, Younger now also applies to
civil actions where the injunction interferes with "important state interests."' 20 7 Because courts require action "fairly attributable to the
State" 20 as an element of Section 1983, virtually every Section 1983 action will involve a state interest. 20 9 In these situations, the Supreme
Court has uniformly invalidated injunctions based on the Younger doc202. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (no violation of due process when
state provides a post-deprivation hearing for intentional deprivation of property); Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-49 (1981) (no violation of due process when state provides a
post-deprivation hearing for negligent deprivation of property); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 347-50 (1976) (no property or liberty interest in public employment); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976) (no property or liberty interest in reputation).
203. Although it seems that the state action cases are as much of "a conceptual disaster area" as ever, see Friendly, The Public-PrivatePenumbra-FourteenYears Later, 130

U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289, 1290 (1982) (quoting Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 TermForeword,81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967)), some recent cases indicate an ongoing attempt
to limit the concept. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-26 (1981) (actions of
a public defender were not under color of state law even though he was a full-time state
employee performing official activities); cf Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463
U.S. 825, 836-39 (1983) (claimed conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of first amendment rights
insufficient for a § 1985(3) claim because not racially based). See generally Blackmun,
Section 1983 and FederalProtection of IndividualRights-Will the Statute Remain Alive

or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 24-26 (1985) (discussing Supreme Court's narrow
construction of state action and color of state law in civil rights cases).
204. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S.
719, 732-33 (1980) (absolute civil immunity for judges and legislators); Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 341-43 (1970) (states have absolute eleventh amendment immunity). But
see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (concluding after
exhaustive reexamination of Civil Rights Act's legislative history that § 1983 applies to
municipalities).
205. See Kreimer, The Source ofLaw in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Sec-

tion 1988, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 601, 605 n.18 (1985) (criticizing Court's limits on § 1983 as
inconsistent with legislative intent); Zeigler, supra note 198, at 1044 (criticizing Younger
doctrine as contrary to congressional intent in enacting Reconstruction jurisdictional
statutes). See generallyDevelopments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv.

L. Rev. 1133, 1174-75 (1977) (describing Court's retreat from expansive interpretation of
§ 1983 based in part on vaguely-expressed concerns of federalism) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].

206. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its five companion cases all concerned
state criminal proceedings. See supra note 190.
207. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979) (state interest in civil child abuse
proceedings is sufficient to invoke the Younger doctrine); see also Trainor v. Hernandez,
431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (state interest in safeguarding the fiscal integrity of public assistance programs sufficient to invoke the Younger doctrine); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
335 (1977) (state interest in contempt proceedings sufficient to invoke the Younger doctrine). See generally Zeigler, supra note 198, at 1039-41 (summarizing lower court extensions of Younger to civil cases).
208. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
209. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. Cf Developments, supra note 206,
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trine without considering Congress' intent that injunctions be
available.2 10
This result seems particularly incongruous in light of the Supreme
Court's exposition of federalism in other contexts. With one glaring exception,2 1 ' Congress has allocated governmental power in the federal system virtually without judicial interference since the New Deal.2 12
Indeed, the most recent case concerning the limits federalism places on

Congress concludes that striking down congressional legislation as "inconsistent with established principles of federalism" was simply not a
proper judicial exercise.2 13 Instead, the only redress for supposed transgressions by Congress against state sovereignty was held to lie in the

states' representation in Congress and their
role in selecting the executive
21 4
and legislative branches of government.

These federalism decisions call into question the legitimacy of the
at 1313-14 & n.233 (suggesting that state action requirement of § 1983 is related to state
interest element of Younger).
210. See Redish II, supra note 191, at 88 ("Younger abstention is all but total"); Soifer
& Macgill, The Younger Doctrine7 Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L Rev. 1141,
1143 (1977) (Younger doctrine constitutes "a single, rigid commandment of federal judicial inaction that violates even such rules as equity and comity could be said to have
contained").
Supreme Court decisions applying the Younger doctrine since 1972 have uniformly
reversed federal court injunctions of state court proceedings. See infra notes 254-59 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the Court has done so without consideration of the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment or § 1983. See Zeigler, supra note 198, at
1037-38.
211. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (plurality decision).
Even the National League of Cities decision itself did not purport to limit congressional
power to legislate under the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 852 n.17.
On the aberrational nature of National League of Cities, see Cox, Federalismand IndividualRights Under the BurgerCourt, 73 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1, 22 (1978) (calling the decision
"thoroughly inconsistent with the constitutional trends and decisions of the past forty
years" and suggesting it ill be regarded as "an unprincipled exception to the general
rule of federal supremacy"); Michaelman, States' Rights and States' Roles. Permutations
of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165, 1184 (1977)
(suggesting the decision is "practically bereft of support in constitutional text or judicial
precedent"); Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and
State Sovereignty Redivius, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1115, 1133-34 (1978) (criticizing Court's
"gratuitous revival" of "the concept of state sovereignty" and expressing hope that it
would quickly be repudiated).
National League of Cities was subsequently severely limited, see EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 242 (1983), and ultimately overruled, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1007 (1985).
212. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79 Colum. L.
Rev. 847, 847 (1979); see Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-i's the States. The
Dispensabilityof JudicialReview, 86 Yale L.J. 1552, 1602 (1977) (noting the "nearly itrebuttable presumption of constitutionality that the Court generally has accorded political decisions in regard to states' rights").
213. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1007
(1985); see also Choper, supra note 212, at 1620-21 (arguing that the Court's use of federalism to strike down federal legislation has undercut Congress' concern for states' rights
and undermines the Court's role in protecting individual rights).
214. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1018-20
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Younger doctrine's limits on Section 1983 injunctions. It seems anomalous for the Court to use this vague federalism doctrine to restrict Congress' command that Section 1983 offer a "uniquely federal remedy
against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation"2 5 when the Court
has eschewed such a role for itself elsewhere. If it is further accepted
that "[t]he predecessor of § 1983 was.., an important part of the basic
alteration in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era
through federal legislation and constitutional amendment, 2 1 6 such a restriction seems particularly unwarranted. 2 7
The Supreme Court's fundamentally inconsistent approach to the
Anti-Injunction Act maximizes the opportunity for judicial manipulation
of Section 1983 and Younger analyses to achieve the desired result in an
individual case.218 This Comment contends that such was the case in
(1985); see also Choper, supra note 212, at 1560-65 (states' rights are protected through
representation in Congress and role in selecting the President).
It has been argued that this political protection is not available to the states against
federal judicial action. See Developments, supra note 205, at 1186-87. This view does not
take sufficient account of the procedural posture of abstention cases. Prior to deciding
whether to abstain, a federal court must first find jurisdiction based on the Constitution
and federal statutes. See Redish II, supra note 191, at 74; Whitten, supra note 192, at
650-51. The states are protected by federal courts against congressional overreaching
through the jurisdictional inquiry. Moreover, they can exercise political checks in legislating federal court jurisdictional statutes. In contrast, by abstaining, the federal courts
are refusing to exercise jurisdiction despite Congress' command that they do so. Therefore, abstention in this context is not a federalism question; rather it is a separation of
powers problem. See Redish II, supra note 191, at 76-79.
The illegitimacy of the Court's refusal to exercise congressionally mandated jurisdiction is underscored by the fact that Congress has already made its policy determination as
to the proper role of federal courts vis-a-vis state courts in the form of the Anti-Injunction Act and the exceptions to it, as well as other limits on federal court power. See
Redish II, supra note 191, at 86 (stating that because Younger's "considerations represent
merely the Supreme Court's social judgment about the relative competence of state and
federal courts or about the harm caused by federal review of state policies, they are illegitimate judicial incursions into an area where Congress has already spoken"); cf Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 403 (1821) ("We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution."). In the face of abstention, Congress has
no way to force courts to use admittedly constitutional jurisdiction which Congress has
mandated. Unlike the states, Congress has no recourse.
215. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
216. Id. at 238.
217. See Field I, supra note 192, at 717 n.157 ("the Younger doctrine does not fit with
Mitchum v. Foster and with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act"); Redish II, supra note
191, at 88 ("if Mitchum is valid, Younger abstention represents an effective reversal of the
congressional decision to make section 1983 an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act");
Whitten, supra note 192, at 650-51 (stressing the inconsistency of Younger with
Mitchum's finding that § 1983 was an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act);
Zeigler, supra note 198, at 990 (criticizing Younger and its progeny as "wholly inconsistent with the congressional purposes" of § 1983).
218. See Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103, 1128 (1977) (noting that Younger doctrine has a malleability not present in statutory limits); Redish II, supra note 191, at 88
("the combined effect ... of the Court's decisions in Younger and Mitchum is that the
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Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.2
B.

9

The Second Circuit'sApplication of the Anti-Injunction Act

Faced with this contradictory Supreme Court precedent, the Second
Circuit stressed Mitchum's interventionist rationale while limiting the
scope of the Younger doctrine. After finding that jurisdiction existed
under Section 1983, the court announced that it "need not tarry over"
the prohibition in the Anti-Injunction Act.2 2 The court relied on
Mitchum to except the injunction from this congressional statement of
federalism and comity.22 1
The court then proceeded to consider Younger, concluding that
[a]ccepting Pennzoil's argument that [Texas' interests in protecting
judgments and in the constitutionality of state statutes] are sufficient to
mandate abstention would broaden Younger to cover almost every
§ 1983 case and thus undermine the Supreme Court's holding in
Mitchum ... that federal courts are empowered by § 1983 to enjoin
ongoing state proceedings. 22
Accordingly, the Second Circuit declined to use Younger to overturn the
injunction.
The court next applied traditional equitable analysis-balancing the
potential financial disaster to Texaco against the consequences to
Pennzoil-to determine whether the Second Circuit's standard for preliminary injunctive relief had been met.2 23 Concluding that the hardship
to Pennzoil from the injunction was heavily outweighed by Texaco's
need for relief,2 24 the court affirmed the order for an injunction. 2 ' The
opinion ended on a cautionary note, however, emphasizing that the "extraordinary
circumstances" of the case were "unlikely ever again to
6
recur."

C.

Rethinking the Second Circuit'sAnti-Injunction Act Analysis

The Second Circuit's opinion underscores the degree to which collapsing the Anti-Injunction Act inquiry into a search for jurisdiction followed by Younger analysis permits unbounded judicial discretion. The
Supreme Court's approach to federal court injunctions of state court profederal judiciary has arrogated to itself the authority to decide when to enjoin state court
proceedings"); Whitten, supra note 192, at 674 ("Read with Younger and its progeny,
Mitchum represents ... an essential step on the part of the Court in retaining for itself an
almost complete discretion to regulate state-federal relationships in the area of anticipatory relief for violation of constitutional rights.").
219. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
220. See iL at 1147.
221. See id

222. Id. at 1149.
223. See id.at 1152-56.

224. See id. at 1155.
225. See iL at 1156.

226. I at 1157.
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ceedings gives insufficient attention to congressional goals with respect to

Section 1983 and the Anti-Injunction Act.2 27 By removing Congress' intent from consideration, courts may base their decisions on their own
judgments of the respective roles of state and federal courts.2 28
The Second Circuit's resolution of the Younger question in Texaco Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co. did not sufficiently consider the Supreme Court's extension of the Younger doctrine since Mitchum. In a case factually indistinguishable from Mitchum, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,2 29 the Court
overturned an injunction based on the Younger doctrine.230 Therefore, it
seems fair to predict that if Mitchum were decided today, the Court
might well dismiss the action based on Younger's progeny. The ease with
which the Second Circuit avoided the nonintervention imperative of
Younger illustrates that this sort of inquiry, in which courts consider an
abstract conceptual doctrine such as comity within a concrete balancing
of the interests
of the parties and the public, lends itself to arbitrary
decisions. 23
The arbitrariness of the Younger analysis in Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co.232 is further demonstrated by the grounds the court used to limit the

precedential value of its decision. The magnitude of the civil judgment,
Texaco's inability to comply with the state bond requirement, and the
"prospect" that the state court would not rule prior to the "irreversible
destruction" of Texaco were all deemed to distinguish Texaco's plight
from other Section 1983 plaintiffs. 23 3 These factors bear on Texaco's im227. See supra note 217.
228. See supra note 218.
229. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
230. See id. at 611-13. Mitchum grew out of a state nuisance action to close a bookstore that offered obscene books for sale. The state court granted an interlocutory order
closing the store. While appeal was pending, the defendant in the state action obtained a1
federal court injunction against the state court order and contempt proceedings. See
Mitchum v. Foster, 315 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (N.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd and remanded, 407
U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972). A three-judge panel overturned the federal injunction based on
the Anti-Injunction Act. See id. at 1389-90. The Supreme Court reversed that decision,
but remanded the case for consideration of the Younger doctrine. See Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972).
Huffman concerned a state nuisance proceeding to close an adult movie house. The
state court ordered the theater closed and certain theater property seized and sold. See
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 598 (1975). Again, rather than appeal the state
court order, the defendant obtained a federal court injunction against enforcing the state
court order. Id. The Supreme Court used the Younger dotrine to overturn the federal
court injunction. See id. at 611-13.
231. See Field I, supra note 192, at 718-20 (noting that the lack of statutory authority
or legitimate policy for the Younger doctrine provides no guidance for application beyond
the discretion of the court); Redish II, supra note 191, at 86 (stating that Younger merely
expresses "the Supreme Court's social judgment about the relative competence of state
and federal courts or about the harm caused by federal review of state policies"); Whitten, supra note 192, at 674, 681-82 (criticizing Court for retaining virtually unlimited
discretion, not articulating rational standards for applying Younger doctrine, and not
fulfilling obligation imposed by Congress to protect constitutional rights).
232. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
233. See id. at 1157. The Second Circuit thus seemed to accept Texaco's proffered

19861

TEXACO INC. v. PENNZOIL CO.

pending deprivations and the lack of adequate opportunity to litigate in
state court, not on the state's interests. Arguably, these concerns are not
different in kind from those faced by any civil defendant who loses and
cannot afford to post a state-required appeals bond.
Because the Second Circuit found Texas' countervailing interest in the
constitutionality of its own procedures to be relatively minor, future state
court litigants presumably should also be entitled to federal court protection from the unfair effects of state court procedures. The Second Circuit
used Texaco's admittedly high stakes to demonstrate the fundamental

inconsistency of Younger's constricting grip on Mitchum's interventionist

rationale.2 34 Under the circumstances of the case, forcing Texaco to risk

financial hemorrhage for the sake of the Supreme Court's vaguely-enunciated Younger doctrine seemed "absurd. 2 35 Despite the Second Circuit's attempt to reseal the breach, these same principles should apply to
other Section 1983 plaintiffs.

In the end, one is left with the words of Professor Tribe in his closing
remarks for Pennzoil that "the most serious guarantee for freedom and

equality is in the rule of law. And if you bend that rule for Texaco, I
think you will break it for all of us., 2 36 The application of Younger

abstention doctrine routinely requires judges to bend the Section 1983
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Perhaps the Second Circuit's stra-

tegically narrow decision will provide the lever to break Younger's barrier for other Section 1983 plaintiffs.
III.

ABSTENTION DOCTRINES

The post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts, and particularly Section
1983,237 have worked a "vast transformation" in our dual system of

courts.2 38 The expansion of Section 1983 jurisdiction 239 and the conse-

line-drawing-that the required bond was so large that it was impossible for anyone to
meet, rather than just impracticable for a particular defendant to meet. See Texaco Brief,
supra note 14, at 35. The distinction was necessary to ward off the specter raised by
Pennzoil of "thousands of persons sitting in Rikers Island who will tell this court that
they are not threats to leave the jurisdiction and there is no need for a bond." Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 112 (Arthur L. Liman).
The difficulty with the line as drawn is that the cases relied on by Texaco for its due
process claim indicate that an individual determination is precisely what is required. See
Texaco Brief, supra note 14, at 32-34 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S.
Ct. 1487 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); see also The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
70, 90 n.26 (1983) (noting requirement of individualized determination in due process
scrutiny of state action).
234. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
235. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y.), aff d in part
and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
236. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 116 (Prof. Laurence Tribe).
237. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
238. Mitchurn v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his
dissenting opinion in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), Justice Brennan
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quent decline in the importance of the Anti-Injunction Act in these actions 2" has made almost every state court proceeding susceptible to
federal court injunction.2 41 The Supreme Court has devised doctrines of
self-restraint in part to avoid the conflict between state and federal courts
inherent in the application of Section 1983.242 These judicial doctrines
require a federal court to refrain from deciding certain cases even where
it may properly exercise jurisdiction under Section 1983 and the Antinoted that "[§] 1983 was enacted ... as § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That Act,
and the Judiciary Act of 1875, which granted the federal courts general federal question
jurisdiction, completely altered Congress' pre-Civil War policy of relying on state courts
to vindicate rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws." Id. at 617 (citations
omitted); see also Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242 ("[The] legislative history [of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871] makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally
created rights .... ."); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 64
(1927) ("Sensitiveness to 'states' rights,' fear of rivalry with state courts and respect for
state sentiment, were swept aside by the great impulse of national feeling born of the Civil
War.... The new exertions of federal power were no longer trusted to the enforcement
of state agencies.").
239. See supra Part I. For example, § 1983 and its jurisdictional statute, § 1343(3),
have been expanded beyond "personal liberty" and now provide redress for "wrongful
deprivations of property" as well. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543
(1972).
240. See supra Part II. Section 1983 has been held to be an exception to the AntiInjunction Act. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972). One commentator has
noted that the Lynch decision in "combination with Mitchum makes the anti-injunction
act almost a dead letter wherever a plaintiff asserts a claim based on the Constitution, as
distinguished from a federal statute." H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View
99 (1973).
241. See Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 181, 218 (1979). This
commentator points out that "whatever a state court does may be deemed as state action
and thus be described as a [§] 1983 deprivation in a federal complaint; it must [be] recognize[d] that the state substantive law of tort, contract, and property may be wrapped in
the tinsel and glitter of real or imagined constitutional deprivations." Id. See supra note
123 and accompanying text.
242. See England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) ("Abstention is a judge-fashioned vehicle for according appropriate deference to the 'respective
competence of the state and federal court systems.' ") (quoting Louisiana P. & L. Co. v.
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959)); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501
(1941) (abstention is the courts contribution toward "furthering the harmonious relation
between state and federal authority"). One of the principles of federalism is that the state
and federal courts should be independent of one another. See Wilson v. Schnettler, 365
U.S. 381, 385 (1961); M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 259 (1980). Section 1983 conflicts with this principle because it empowers
federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
242 (1972) (Congress authorized federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings in
§ 1983 actions by authorizing suits in equity as a means of redressing constitutional violations). The Supreme Court has recognized this type of interference as "perhaps the most
sensitive source of friction between States and Nation." Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.
117, 120 (1951).
The abstention doctrines are most frequently applied to cases involving a federal constitutional challenge to state action. However, they also apply to other forms of federal
jurisdiction. See infra note 243.
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Injunction Act.243
This Part of the Comment discusses abstention as it has been developed in Younger v. Harris2" and Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.24 5
and their progeny. It suggests that in light of the principles underlying
these decisions, the district court should have declined to intervene until
it was clearer that Texas courts could not provide Texaco with a hearing
on its due process claims. It concludes, however, that the standards for

abstention under Younger and Pullman abstention are sufficiently flexible
to support the Second Circuit's finding that neither doctrine mandated
abstention.
A. Younger Abstention
Younger abstention is a recent extension of the Court's abstention doctrine. It was first articulated in 1971 by Justice Black, writing for the
Court in Younger v. Harris.2' Justice Black relied on sweeping principles of comity and federalism2 47 to justify limitation of federal court ju243. For a discussion of the role of abstention, see 17 C. Wright, A Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 4241-4242 (1978); Redish II, supra note 191.
The Court has developed various categories of abstention to handle particular
problems that arise in a system of federalism. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976) (federal courts for reasons of "wise
judicial administration" may dismiss a case if there is a concurrent proceeding in state
court); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (federal courts may not enjoin state
criminal prosecutions); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943) (abstention is
appropriate to avoid unnecessary conflict with specialized aspects of complicated regulatory scheme); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (abstention is
warranted when an unsettled question of state law is the subject of constitutional attack).
The scope of Younger has subsequently expanded. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
244. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For a discussion of Younger abstention, see infra Part III.A.
245. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman abstention is discussed in infra Part III.B.

246. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The federal plaintiff, Harris, had been indicted under a Cali-

fornia law that made it illegal to advocate the use of violence to overthrow the government. Id at 38 & n.1. He filed suit in the federal district court to enjoin Younger, the
Los Angeles district attorney, from prosecuting him, claiming that the prosecution inhibited his right of free speech. Id. at 38-39. A three-judge district court panel, relying on
the Court's decision in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), issued the injunction
on the grounds that the California statute was vague and overbroad. Younger, 401 U.S.
at 40, 50. In Dombrowski, the Court held that federal courts could enjoin state officers
from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute under a state statute that was so broad and
vague that it interfered unconstitutionally with first amendment rights. Dombrowski, 380
U.S. at 490-92. Dombrowski was interpreted as marking a major change in federal-state
relations. See C. Wright, supra note 40, at 322. Many read the decision as meaning that
"every person prosecuted under state law for conduct arguably protected by the First
Amendment could, by murmuring the words 'chilling efflect,' halt the state prosecution
while a federal court... passed on the validity of the statute and the bona fides of the
state law enforcement officers." Id. at 322. The Court rejected this interpretation in
Younger, stating that an incidental "chilling effect" of a statute is not enough to render it
unconstitutional. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 51.
247. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Black referred to the notions of comity and federalism
to explain the doctrine of "Our Federalism," which he defined as "a system in which
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments,
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risdiction under Section 1983 and held that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, 248 federal courts must not enjoin pending state criminal
proceedings.249
1. Elements of Younger Abstention
The Supreme Court has expanded the Younger abstention doctrine beyond its roots in criminal proceedings. Younger now requires federal
courts to abstain from interfering in an ongoing state proceeding 250 when
an important state interest is implicated 25' and the state proceeding provides an adequate opportunity to present the federal constitutional

claims.252

The scope of state interests requiring Younger deference has yet to be
adequately defined by the Supreme Court. 25 3 At present the Court has
and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id.
248. The Court recognized two narrow exceptions to the prohibition against federal
intervention: where the prosecution is brought in bad faith to harass the defendant, id. at
49, and where the statute under which the prosecution is brought is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply
it." Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 379, 402 (1941)).
These exceptions are inconsistent with one of the Court's justifications for Younger
deference. See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text. If state courts are as competent to protect constitutional rights as federal courts, then presumably state courts are
equally competent to dismiss a prosecution brought in bad faith or to invalidate a patently unconstitutional statute. See Redish, The Doctrineof Younger v. Harris: Deference
in Search of a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 474 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Redish
III].
249. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
250. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 440, 461 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 330 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 602 (1975). A state proceeding is considered ongoing despite the completion of the underlying state trial if the state litigant has not exhausted his state claims.
See id. at 607-09; see also City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 908 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The federal action must be dismissed not only where it threatens to
interfere with active state proceedings but also where state proceedings have ended because of the failure of the federal plaintiff to appeal an adverse state decision."), denying
cert. to City of Columbus v. Leonard, 565 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1978); C. Wright, A. Miller
& E. Cooper, supra note 243, § 4253 at 565 ("If a state proceeding was pending at a time
that invokes the Younger rules, those rules remain applicable through the completion of
all state appellate remedies.").
In the absence of a pending state proceeding, "considerations of equity, comity and
federalism have little vitality." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
251. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
252. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 441 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977).
253. See Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir.
1986) ("The Supreme Court has not yet provided any type of analytical framework for
determining whether, for abstention purposes, a vital state interest is present."); Redish
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explicitly declared six state interests sufficiently important to warrant
Younger abstention: I) criminal proceedings, 254 2) quasi-criminal proceedings, 255 3) proceedings brought to vindicate the regular operation of
the state's judicial system, such as contempt, 256 4) proceedings brought
to protect the financial viability of the state's social programs, 257 5) proceedings brought to protect abused children,2 58 and 6) state bar disciplinary proceedings. 259 Nevertheless, beyond these individual applications
of Younger, "detailed exposition of the nature' 2and
scope of the relevant
°
state interests has been virtually nonexistent.
III, supra note 248, at 465 ("The Court's words rarely go beyond the ambiguous rhetoric
of Younger itself or the superficial and conclusory assertion that failure to invoke Younger
deference will jeopardize the viability of a certain state institution or state interest.");
Soifer & Macgill, supra note 210, at 1214-15 ("[T]here is no single goal that can reasonably be imputed to the entire Court that justifies or even adequately explains the Younger
doctrine."); Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 Hastings LJ. 103, 185
(1981) ("The most troublesome aspect of Younger is the amorphous nature of 'comity,' a
slogan that has no logical stopping place and few, if any, historical boundaries ... .
254. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-54.
255. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975). In Huffman, a county
sheriff and prosecuting attorney brought state nuisance proceedings to close an adult
movie theater. IM at 595. The state court closed the theater. Id. at 598. Rather than
pursue an appeal through the state judicial system, the defendant brought a federal action
to declare the nuisance statute unconstitutional and unenforceable. Id. The Court held
that the state's interest in a nuisance proceeding, which is closely related to its criminal
laws, is important enough to mandate Younger abstention. Id. at 604-05.
256. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977). Vail, the state court defendant, had
repeatedly failed to obey court orders. Id. at 329-30. A contempt order was entered
against him and upon failure to pay the fine, the defendant was jailed. Id. After he paid
the fine and was released, Vail brought an action in federal court to enjoin the state judges
from using their statutory contempt powers, alleging deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 430. The Court held, "[a] State's interest in the contempt process,
through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system ... is... an
important interest." Id, at 335.
257. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977). In the underlying state action in Trainor, the Illinois Department of Public Aid filed a lawsuit to recover wrongfully received public welfare funds. Id. at 435-36. The defendants were accused of
fraudulently concealing funds while applying for and receiving public aid. Id. at 435.
The defendants brought suit in federal court rather than filing an answer in state court.
Id. at 437-38.
258. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). In Moore, the state filed suit to have
children of suspected child abusers taken from parents and delivered into the temporary
custody of a social service agency. See id. at 419-22. The district court preliminarily
enjoined Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the challenged statute until its constitutionality was settled. Id at 421-22. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
removal of a child in a child abuse context is "'in aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes'" and hence an important state interest. Id. at 423 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
259. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,
434-35 (1982). The federal plaintiff in Middlesex, an attorney, sharply criticized an ongoing criminal proceeding at a press conference. See id. at 428. He was charged with violating New Jersey bar disciplinary rules. IdM Instead of filing an answer, he filed suit in
federal district court contending that the disciplinary rules violated his first amendment
rights. Id at 429. The Supreme Court ordered abstention, holding that the state has an
important interest in maintaining the integrity of the attorneys it licenses. Id. at 434-35.
260. Redish III, supra note 249, at 465. See supra note 253.
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Even if Younger abstention would otherwise be warranted, it is inappropriate when the pending state proceeding does not provide the parties
with an adequate opportunity to air the constitutional issues. 26 1 The

Supreme Court's decisions provide little guidance on what constitutes an
adequate opportunity to present constitutional claims.2 62

2. The Second Circuit's Application of Younger
Applying Younger to the facts of Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,263 the
Second Circuit held that although there was clearly an ongoing state judicial proceeding, 2 64 no state interests of the type required for Younger
abstention were implicated.2 65 The mere existence of an ongoing state

judicial proceeding was insufficient to create state interests requiring
Younger abstention. The court further determined that, even if an important state interest had been at stake, the Texas proceeding did not
provide Texaco with an adequate opportunity to present its due process
challenges.2 66
The Second Circuit held that neither Texas' interest in protecting judgment creditors nor its interest in the constitutionality of its statutes required abstention.2 67 It distinguished Texas' interest in the underlying
state action from the state interests recognized by the Supreme Court in
the Younger line of cases: "In each of [the Younger] cases the state government or a state official was a party to the action which the federal
court was being asked to enjoin and had a direct stake in the outcome
261. See, e.g., Middlesex Ethics County Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 432 (1982) (the third requirement for Younger abstention is an opportunity in tile
state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430
(1979) ("only pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims"); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577
(1973) (Younger "naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided
by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.").
262. See Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516, 518 (N.D. Ill.
1978), aff'd sub nom.
Quern v. Hernandez, 440 U.S. 951 (1979). In Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), the
Court held that a district court must abstain unless "state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims." Id. at 425-26. Accordingly, it would stand to reason
that in the absence of such a bar an adequate opportunity is available. In Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), it was uncertain whether the federal plaintiffs could
raise their due process challenges in the state attachment proceedings below. See id. at
447. Because it was an issue "heavily laden" with local law, the Court remanded the
matter to the district court for a decision on this matter. See id. at 447-48. On remand
the district court found that the Hernandezes could not present their federal claims in the
state attachment proceeding. See Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516, 519-20 (N.D.
Ill. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Quern v. Hernandez, 440 U.S. 951 (1979).
263. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
264. See id. at 1149 ("Since the third condition [that there be an ongoing state proceeding] is clearly met in the present case, we need not discuss it.").
265. See id. at 1149-50.
266. See id. at 1150-51. See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
267. See id. at 1149. The Second Circuit reasoned that finding these interests to be
sufficient to require Younger abstention would seriously undermine the Supreme Court's
holding in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), see supra note 240, because a similar
interest exists in every state proceeding. See Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1149.
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... 26 It concluded that since an injunction of Pennzoil did not prevent Texas from "acting to vindicate a state policy or to punish an infraction of state rules," Younger abstention was unwarranted. 6 9 Further,

the court expressly limited its holding that the Texas bond and lien provisions were unconstitutional to the "unique and extraordinary circumstances of [this] case."2 7 Texas' interests in protecting judgment
creditors and in the constitutionality of its statutes were therefore "relatively minor."2 7' 1
Turning to the adequacy of the Texas state procedures, the Second
Circuit found that Texas mandamus procedures were too uncertain772
and in any event too slow to provide the timely relief Texaco needed.27 3
The court reasoned that any state procedure is inadequate unless the par-

ties may "with certainty obtain a resolution of constitutional claims from
the state courts.

' 27 4

Because mandamus is an "extraordinary" writ

granted only in exceptional circumstances, the court held that it could
never be considered adequate for Younger purposes. 2 " Further, the Sec-

ond Circuit determined that even if Texaco had been granted a writ of
mandamus, this relief would have been inadequate because mandamus

proceedings were too slow to provide Texaco with the timely relief

needed.276 The court found that the protection against Pennzoil's execution of the Texas judgment provided by paragraph 7 of the Texas judgment 277 would have expired long before Texas courts 27could
resolve
8
Texaco's challenge to the supersedeas bond requirement.
3.

A Reapplication of Younger Principles to
Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.

In the Younger cases, the Supreme Court has made limited holdings
268. Texaco Inc, 784 F.2d at 1149.
269. Ia.at 1150.
270. Id.
271. Id. ("The Texas lien and bond provisions will in most other circumstances continue to be respected and enforced as written by the Texas legislature and the Texas
Supreme Court.").
272. See id.at 1151.
273. See id.at 1151-52.
274. Id. at 1151.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 1151-52. To apply for a writ of mandamus, Texaco would first have to
ask the trial court to disregard the supersedeas bond rule, which the Second Circuit noted
it would probably refuse to do. See id. at 1151. Further, the Second Circuit reasoned,
even if Texaco were granted a writ of mandamus there was no assurance that the Texas
appellate court would grant a stay of execution pending its determination on the constitutionality of the bond and lien provisions. Id
277. See paragraph 7 supra note 20 and accompanying text.
278. Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1152. The protection provided by paragraph 7 expired
once the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 1137. See supra note 20. The
Second Circuit determined that the jurisdiction would terminate by March 25, 1986. See
id. at 1137 n.3. At the time Texaco moved for a preliminary injunction before the district
court, the judgment would not have expired before February 9, 1986. See Texaco Brief,
supra note 12, at 21 n.26.
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and has declined to extend these holdings beyond the facts of each

case. 279 However, in deciding these cases the Court has used broad rationales 280 and language28 ' that would support abstention from all pending
state proceedings. The Second Circuit based its finding that there were
no "important" state interests to warrant abstention on a narrow reading

of Supreme Court precedent. This reliance on the specific holdings of
these cases supports a finding that Younger abstention was unwarranted
in Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. In each of the Younger cases decided by
the Court, the state has had a direct interest in the state court proceed279. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 445 n.8 (1977) (abstaining from proceedings brought by the state to recover welfare payments, but stating "we have no occasion
to decide whether Younger principles apply to all civil litigation"); Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 336 n.13 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.) (abstaining from bar disciplinary hearings, and
"sav[ing] for another day the question of 'the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation' ") (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975)); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975) ("Informed by the relevant principles of comity and federalism, at least three Courts of Appeals have applied Younger when the pending state
proceedings were civil in nature .... For the purposes of the case before us, however, we
need make no general pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to all civil litigation.") (citing Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978
(1974); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974));
Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1972)).
280. The Court in Younger relied on the doctrine that courts of equity normally will
not interfere in criminal proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. A "more vital consideration," however, was respect for the notions of comity and federalism. Id. at 44. Justice Black described comity in part as a belief that the "National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways." Id. The concept of federalism is characterized by the Court as
representing a "system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments." Id. The Court in subsequent decisions has continued
to rely on these broad principles. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601, 604 (1975). These decisions have done little to clarify
the Younger analysis. See text accompanying supra notes 253 and 260.
281. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 431 (1982) ("Younger v. Harris, and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy
against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.") (citation omitted); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,
604 (1975). In Huffman, Justice Rehnquist offered four reasons why considerations of
federalism and comity apply to civil proceedings as well as to criminal proceedings:
[Ilnterference with a state judicial proceeding [1] prevents the state not only
from effectuating its substantive policies, but also [2] from continuing to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any
constitutional objections interposed against those policies. Such interference
also [3] results in duplicative legal proceedings, and [4] can readily be interpreted "as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles."
Id. (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)); see also Ohio Bureau of
Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1977) (dictum) (Younger is
"designed to allow the State an opportunity to 'set its own house in order' when the
federal issue is already before a state tribunal"). If the Court's language in these decisions
is followed, "important" state interests are irrelevant in a Younger analysis.
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ings. If one party lost, the state stood to have a particular policy frustrated.2" 2 The only relevant interests at stake in the Texas proceeding,
however, were those of two private litigants, Texaco and Pennzoil. As

the Second Circuit found: "The state interests at stake in this proceeding
differ in both kind and degree from those present in the six cases in which
the Supreme Court held that Younger applied."2 3
The Court's unwillingness to articulate clear standards delimiting
Younger abstention,2" 4 however, permits wide latitude in the application
of the doctrine.2"' Although amply justified by the Court's holdings, the
Second Circuit's "important" state interest analysis contravenes the basic
principles underlying the Younger doctrine. Younger and its progeny relied on broad principles of comity and federalism.28 6 These considera-

tions apply whenever a federal court is asked to enjoin state court
proceedings, regardless of whether there is an "important" state interest
in the proceeding.2 87 For example, the Anti-Injunction Act 2 8 referred to
in Younger as the statutory embodiment of federalism2 9 does not distin-

guish a proceeding in which an important state interest is present from
one in which it is not.290

Federal court injunctions of state court proceedings violate the notion
of comity inherent in our dual court system. State courts share equally
with federal courts the responsibility "to guard, enforce, and protect
every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United
States. '29 1 Supreme Court decisions emphasize that federal courts
should not intervene in a state proceeding because doing so impliedly
282. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982) (regulation of attorneys); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (protection of
abused children); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (financial viability of welfare programs); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (orderly judicial proceedings);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (enforcement of laws closely resembling
criminal proceedings); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (criminal law enforcement).
283. Texaco Inc, 784 F.2d at 1149.
284. See Whitten, supra note 192, at 596 ("[Tl]he court has failed to articulate a workable, principled formula for allocating responsibility for constitutional adjudication between the two systems of courts."). See also supra note 253.
285. Compare Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Younger abstention is inappropriate unless the underlying state proceeding is
either criminal in nature, in aid of or related criminal proceedings or fundamental to the
operation of its courts) with Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1973) ("A
district court ...cannot enjoin a state civil proceeding unless [it] finds that the state
proceeding cannot eliminate the threat to the plaintiff's right."), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974).
286. See supra note 247.
287. See text accompanying infra notes 291-99.
288. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
289. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (Anti-Injunction Act is manifestation of Congress' longstanding "desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal
courts.").
290. See supra Part II.
291. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111
U.S. 624, 637 (1884)); see Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 1973) ("[I]t should
never be forgotten that the Constitution literally calls state judges by name ...and puts
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questions a state judiciary's ability to recognize and vindicate federal
constitutional claims.29 2 Federal intervention in a proceeding remains an
insult to state judges even when no "important" state interest is at stake.
In both cases federal intervention implies that the state judiciary is unwilling or unable to interpret the Constitution or protect federal rights.2 93
The other principle behind Younger, federalism, prohibits undue interference by federal courts in legitimate activities of the states. 294 Providing a competent forum to vindicate federal constitutional challenges and
overseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional issues are both "legitimate activities" of the state.2 9 In characterizing the Younger doctrine as
"designed to allow the State an opportunity to 'set its own house in order' when the federal issue is already before a state tribunal, ' 296 the
Supreme Court has emphasized the relevance of this aspect of federalism
to Younger. A federal court deprives the state of this opportunity when
it enjoins a state court proceeding even though the state may have no
interest in the underlying proceeding itself.
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal intervention in an
ongoing proceeding is one of the major sources of federal-state friction.2 97 As the Second Circuit stated with regard to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, "we have two 'essentially separate legal systems.' '[T]his dual
system could not function if state and federal courts were free to fight
each other for control of a particular case.' "298 Reserving Younger deference for those state court proceedings in which an "important" state
interest is present leaves the majority of state judicial proceedings vulnerable to federal injunction.2 99 If Younger abstention is limited in this
manner, then many of the problems it was meant to redress remain
unresolved.
If these aspects of comity and federalism are sufficient to invoke
Younger abstention, then the Second Circuit should have refused to enjoin Pennzoil from executing the Texas judgment. In upholding the district court's injunction, the Second Circuit implied that the Texas
upon them the obligation to apply the supreme Law of the Land."), cert denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974).
292. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431
(1982) ("Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludes any presumption
that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.") (emphasis in original); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977) (injunction of state proceeding reflects negatively on state court's ability to safeguard constitutional rights); Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327, 336 (1977) (interference in state court proceeding can easily be interpreted
as a negative reflection of the state court's ability to enforce the Constitution); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (same).
293. See Redish III, supra note 248, at 476 n.80.
294. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (1971).
295. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, 609 (1975).
296. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1977).
297. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
298. Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1142 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)).
299. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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judiciary was incapable of vindicating Texaco's constitutional claims. 3co
It also denied Texas one of its legitimate functions under our system of

federalism, that of providing a forum for federal constitutional challenges

that arise during the course of state court proceedings. 30 1 Whether these
concerns alone are sufficient to invoke Younger abstention remains unresolved by the Supreme Court decisions to date because in each of its
previous Younger holdings there was an alternative state interest that jus-

tified abstention."a 2

The Second Circuit also found that Younger abstention was inapplica-

ble because Texas' rules did not provide adequate procedures for adjudi-

cation of Texaco's federal claims.30 3 This finding was critical because an
adequate state forum for presentation of a party's constitutional challenges is a prerequisite to abstention under Younger.3 The Second Circuit, however, erred in holding unequivocally that state mandamus
proceedings never constitute an adequate forum under Younger. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Moore v. Sims, 305 has stated that "the
federal court should not exert jurisdiction if the plaintiffs 'had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings.' "2306 He
continued, "abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the
interposition of the constitutional claims. ' 3 7 Texas law does not clearly
deprive Texaco of the opportunity to raise its due process challenge. In
fact, review of a Texas case cited by the Second Circuit indicates that
application of the supersedeas bond has been successfully challenged

300. The Texas judge who presided over the first part of the trial in Texas was clearly
insulted by the district court's intervention. While presiding over a later unrelated case,
Judge Farris has been quoted as admonishing Texaco's Texas trial counsel: "Do not cite
any decisions by White Plains, N.Y., federal judges." See Wall St. I., Mar. 14, 1986, at 1,
col. 6. See also supra note 43 (discussing exchange of letters between Texaco counsel and
Judge Farris on a related matter).
301. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
303. See Texaco Inc, 784 F.2d at 1150-52. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's
finding that mandamus proceedings were inadequate, see supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 252, 261 and accompanying text.
305. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
306. l at 425 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977)).
307. Id at 425-26.
Contrary to the Second Circuit's assertion, Texaco Inc, 784 F.2d at 1151, other federal
courts have explicitly found mandamus proceedings adequate in the Younger context and
have refused to intervene when this alternative was open to the parties in state court. See
Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 775-76 (4th Cir. 1973) (since the overbreadth of the court
order may be cured "by an immediate appeal to the state appellate courts, the use of
prerogative writs by those courts, or even by defending at the final trial" defendant's
remedy at law is adequate), cerL denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Winslow v. Leh, 577 F.
Supp. 951, 953 (D. Colo. 1984) (since federal court plaintiffs could raise state claims in
state court by writ of certiorari as well as by "certain extraordinary writs," federal court
injunctive relief was inappropriate). But see Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 684
(6th Cir. 1985) (abstention inappropriate where only procedure available to raise federal
claims was by writ of mandamus); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262,
267 n.7 (2d Cir. 1968) (same).
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through mandamus proceedings.3 °s
The Second Circuit's decision that Texas procedures were inadequate
was also premature. Its finding has merit only if one accepts Texaco's
assertion that it needed immediate relief.30 9 This premise, however, is
open to question. Texaco was already protected by paragraph 7, the
provision within the Texas trial court judgment that precluded execution
of the judgment by Pennzoil.3" ' By Texaco's own admission, this provision would have protected it for at least two months while it sought relief
from the supersedeas bond provision in the Texas courts.3 1' Although
Texaco alleged injury in that interim period,3 12 it is questionable whether
such damage should be attributed to the judgment or, rather, to the uncertainty of the appeal. 3 3 Further, it is doubtful that Texaco would suf308. See Mudd v. Mudd, 665 S.W.2d 128, 129-31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (supersedeas

bond set in excess of amount required under statute successfully reduced through writ of
mandamus).
309. Texaco alleged that it was on the "verge of bankruptcy" prior to obtaining a
temporary restraining order from the district court. See Texaco Brief, supra note 12, at 2.
310. See paragraph 7, supra note 20.
311. The Texas judgment was entered on December 10, 1985, see Texaco Brief, supra
note 12, at 19. At the time that Texaco's motion for a preliminary injunction was made,
the earliest the provisions of paragraph 7 would expire was February 9, 1986. See Texaco
Brief, supra note 12, at 21 n.26.
312. Texaco challenged the adequacy of paragraph 7 as protection on two grounds.
First, its temporary nature would affect Texaco's ability to borrow money and to receive
supplies. Second, because paragraph 7 did not allow Texaco to engage in transactions
other than "in the routine and ordinary course of business" others were reluctant to deal
with them due to uncertainty over whether transactions would be permitted. Id. at 2021.
Specifically, Texaco asserted, and the district court acknowledged, that the following
events occurred immediately after the Texas judgment was entered:
the market for Texaco's long-term debt securities disappeared; its credit ratings
were downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade; it was forced
to withdraw from the commercial paper market; its bank credit lines were lost;
it became unable to obtain unsecured bank financing; it became unable to obtain
most secured financing; firms contemplating commercial ventures with Texaco
withdrew from them; companies already engaged in ventures with Texaco
found their own financial standing severely impaired.
Id. at 21 n.27; see Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part,784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
313. Texaco claimed that "the uncertainty as to what will happen when the provisions
of Paragraph 7 of the Judgment expire or are otherwise vacated or modified threatens
Texaco's present ability to obtain the financing required to run and preserve its business
.... " Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 5.
Both the Second Circuit, see Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1152-53, and the district court,
see Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), however, found that the potential bankruptcy of
Texaco, which could occur if Pennzoil enforced the judgment, would satisfy the "irreparable harm" standard necessary for injunctive relief.
Texaco's assertion that the "uncertainty" of paragraph 7 was causing irreparable harm
is suspect for two reasons. First, it is more probable that the judgment itself and not
uncertainties regarding relief was the prime catalyst for the financial community's reaction. Even if an appeal were guaranteed, the victim of an $11.8 billion judgment, the
largest in history, should reasonably expect a certain degree of hesitation by the financial
community. Second, Texaco's assertion that the nation's fifth largest corporation would
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fer irreparable harm.314 The Second Circuit, in finding the Texas
mandamus proceedings inadequate, did not rely on this allegation. Instead it was influenced by its expectation that the protective
provision
3 5
would have expired before the Texas courts could act. 1
Rather than assuming that the Texas judiciary could not have acted
quickly enough to save Texaco, the Second Circuit should have deferred
until the Texas procedures were proved inadequate.31 6 Not only is such
deference proper under the Younger abstention doctrine, but it also
would have conformed with principles of Pullman abstention.
B.

Pullman Abstention

Pullman abstention was first articulated by Justice Frankfurter writing
for a unanimous Court in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 31 7 Pullman held that when a federal constitutional claim is premised on an unsettled question of state law, a federal court should abstain from hearing
the federal claim in order to permit the state court to adjudicate the underlying state-law question. 318 The premise of Pullman is that federalism
suffer bankruptcy due to the financial community's restrictions is doubtful. Texaco itself
did not believe that bankruptcy was necessary. Though the company was poised and
ready to declare bankruptcy immediately following the announcement of the Texas judgment, only the inclusion of paragraph 7 stopped it from doing so. See Wall St. J., Mar.
14, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
314. As described above, see supra note 313, it is unlikely that the uncertainties in the
interim period under paragraph 7 would cause Texaco to go into bankruptcy. Even accepting the reactions of the financial community alleged by Texaco, see supra note 312, it
is hard to believe that a company so large could not survive a few months of tightened
cash flow and lost expansion opportunities.
315. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1151-52 (2d Cir. 1986) (before Texas
Supreme Court could act on Texaco's challenge to the supersedeas bond rule, "Par. 7 of
the Texas judgment [would have] long since expired, [and] Pennzoil would have executed
its S11.12 billion judgment, forcing Texaco down the path of no return").
316. See Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 1973) ("A party may not invoke
the aid of a federal court, alleging that his state remedies are inadequate, without having
first tested the sufficiency of those remedies and having found them to be wanting."), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
317. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman involved a challenge to an order of the Texas Railroad Commission that all sleeping cars operated by the railroads in Texas must be in the
charge of a Pullman conductor. Prior to the Commission's order, trains with only one
sleeping car had been in the charge of a porter rather than a conductor. Porters were
black, conductors were white. Id. at 497. The order was attacked on the grounds that it
violated the commerce, due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and
that it was invalid under Texas law. kId at 498. A three-judge district court panel held
that the Commission's order was invalid under Texas law. See Pullman Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675, 676 (W.D. Tex. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for abstention because it was
unclear whether the Commission's order was authorized by the Texas statute, which empowered it "to prevent 'unjust discrimination [in the rates, charges and tolls of such railroads] ... and to prevent any and all other abuses' in the conduct of [their business]."
Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499 (quotations and deletion in original). See id. at 501-02.
318. See id.at 498-500. When a federal court abstains under Pullman, it usually retains jurisdiction over the federal question pending the proceedings in the state court on
the state law issue. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1971);
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is best served when federal courts refrain from deciding constitutional

issues based on "forecasts" of what state law may be.3 19 Such deference
serves two purposes: federal-state tension is minimized and potentially

unnecessary constitutional adjudication is avoided.320

1. Elements of Pullman Abstention
Courts routinely require that three conditions be met before Pullman
abstention is warranted.32 1 First, there must be an unsettled question of
state law. An otherwise clear state law is unsettled for Pullman purposes
if there is a fair possibility that the state statute violates a provision of the
state constitution having no counterpart in the federal Constitution.3 22
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967). The Supreme Court has made an exception to this procedure for cases from Texas. See Harris County Comm'rs Court v.
Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975). The Texas Supreme Court has ruled that it cannot
grant declaratory relief under state law if a federal court retains jurisdiction over the
federal claim. See United States Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex.
1965). Therefore for Texas cases, the Supreme Court adopted the course of ordering
dismissal without prejudice. See Harris County, 420 U.S. at 88-89.
319. See Pullman, at 499-501 ("In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to
decide an issue by making a tenative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state
adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal
court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.") (citation omitted). In
a later decision, Justice Frankfurter, while noting that Pullman and its progeny were
cases in equity, stated, "[t]hey reflect a deeper policy derived from our federalism." See
Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
320. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 347 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (federal
courts should abstain where "state-court construction may obviate or significantly modify
the federal questions seemingly presented, thus avoiding 'unnecessary friction in federalstate relations, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional adjudication' ") (quoting Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965)); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1970) (federal
court should abstain if "[a] state court decision... could conceivably avoid any decision
under the [Constitution] and [hence] avoid any possible irritant in the federal-state relationship"); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498-501 ("'exercising a wise discretion,' [federal
courts ] restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary").
321. See Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 347 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420
U.S. 77, 83 (1975).
322. See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84 (1975) (abstention
is appropriate where the "uncertain status of local law stems from the unsettled relationship between the state constitution and a statute"); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87
(1970) (per curiam) (abstention ordered where unconstrued state law is subject to challenge under a related constitutional provision); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 641 (1959) ("[W]hen the state court's interpretation of the statute
or evaluation of its validity under the state constitution may obviate any need to consider
its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should hold its hand, lest it
render a constitutional decision unnecessarily.").
The Supreme Court, however, has cautioned that if the state constitutional provision
simply mirrors of the controlling federal provision, abstention is inappropriate. Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkif, 467 U.S. 229, 237 n.4 (1984); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598 (1976); Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S.
77, 84 n.8 (1975).
Most state constitutions have some form of due process clause and some form of equal
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Second, this state law question must be subject to a resolution that would
either obviate the need for a constitutional decision or at least substantially change the focus of such an inquiry.3 23 Finally, the state must provide an adequate procedure to resolve the state law issue.3 24 Because
answers to state law questions can be pursued in state courts through the
certification process325 or by bringing a declaratory law action in state
court, 326 case law provides little guidance on whether an alternative pro-

cedure is adequate.32 7
When these requirements are met, the principles of federalism and
avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions mandate abstention.
2.

Application of Pullman

The Second Circuit held that the meaning of the Texas supersedeas
bond rule was "crystal clear" 3' 28 and thus declined to abstain under the
Pullman doctrine. The court based its decision both on the language of
the rule itself32 9 and on its application by Texas courts. 330 The State of
Texas, as intervenor, argued that the meaning of the supersedeas bond
rule was unsettled because, as applied to Texaco, it violated the "open
courts" provision of the Texas constitution. 3 1 The Second Circuit gave
protection clause. If a district court were required to defer to state courts for adjudication under the state provisions, abstention would be the rule for most civil rights cases.
See Stephens v. Tielsch, 502 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1974).
323. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498.
324. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 626 (1946); Vickers v. Trainor, 546
F.2d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Field, Abstention in Constitutional Caser." The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 1144 (1974) ("It is
settled that a federal court can order abstention only if the state provides the parties with
adequate means to adjudicate the controverted state law issue.") [hereinafter cited as
Field II].
325. Many states have adopted certification procedures. See C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, supra note 306, § 4248, at 525 & n.9 (listing states that allow certification). Certification is a procedure that allows the federal court to refer the state law issue directly to
the state's highest court for resolution. See Field, The Abstention DoctrineToday, 125 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 590, 606-07 (1977).
326. If the certification procedure is unavailable, ordinarily the federal plaintiff will
bring a suit for declaratory judgment. See C. Wright, A. Miller & F Cooper, supra note
243, § 4243, at 474.
327. See Field II, supra note 324, at 1144 ("The case law is less than clear... as to
which remedies are adequate."). "The state procedure should be deemed inadequate
whenever it is so cumbersome that the individual litigant suffers substantial prejudice in
addition to that necessarily accompanying the abstention procedure." Id. n.200 (1974).
328. See Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1148.
329. See id ("The meaning of the Texas lien and bond provisions is far from uncertain.
On the contrary, the language of Tex. R. Civ. P. 364 and Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 52.001
et seq., is crystal clear."). For text and discussion of the supersedeas bond rule, see supra
notes 17 and 19.
330. See Texaco Inc, 784 F.2d at 1148 (Texas courts have refused to reduce supersedeas bonds below the amount dictated by Rule 364 even though the party seeking to
appeal the decision claimed he could not post the required amount). For a discussion of
cases cited, see infra note 366.
331. See Brief of State of Texas, Intervenor-Appellant at 14-15, Texaco Inc. v.
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short shrift to Texas' contention. "Pullman abstention," the court wrote,
"may not be predicated on the possibility that a state court could interlanguage of the state constitution to overrule a state statpret the broad
332
ute or rule.",
3. A Reapplication of Pullman
While the Pullman test is well defined, because its standards are flexible the results of applying the doctrine can vary widely depending upon
the individual who makes the determination.333
The primary ambiguity in the Pullman analysis lies in the requirement
that state law be "unsettled. ' 334 The facial clarity of Texas' supersedeas
bond provision 335 and the long line of cases requiring compliance with
the rule336 lend strong support for the Second Circuit's finding that the
law was "settled." However, Texas' argument that the supersedas bond
provision was unsettled was also valid. Even a state law that is clear on
its face is unsettled for Pullman purposes if the state law at issue violates
Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986). The State of Texas argued that making a
grant of a legal right contingent on an impossible condition such as conditioning the right
to stay judgment on payment of a $12 billion supersedeas bond violated the "open
courts" provision of the Texas constitution, See id.
332. Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1148 n.12.
333. See Field I, supra note 192, at 697. Questions of degree pervade the Pullman
doctrine. See J. Moore, W. Taggart, A. Vestal & J. Wicker, IA Moore's Federal Practice
V 0.203[l], at 2119 (1985).
334. See id. The courts have not developed a precise standard of how uncertain a state
law must be. See J. Moore, supra note 333, at 2107.
335. For the text of the statute, see supra note 17.
336. See Mudd v. Mudd, 665 S.W.2d 128, 129-30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (by writ of
mandamus, appellant moved that the supersedeas bond be reduced to $642,313.78 plus
interest, the minimum required by statute; the court of appeals granted the motion, holding that, while the rule required bond to be posted at least in the amount ofjudgment plus
interest, this did not authorize trial court to set bond amount so in excess of minimum as
to be inequitable); Anderson v. Pioneer Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 150 S.W.2d 445, 446-47
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (Anderson requested the appeals court to enjoin the execution of
judgment pending appeal arguing that she could not afford to post bond, and her house
would be taken from her before she could appeal the judgment); Bryan v. Luhning, 106
S.W.2d 403, 403-04 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (suit in trial court over title to race horse and
$400 winnings; judgment was awarded against Bryan; Bryan alleged that he was unable
to post bond, requested an injunction to restrain execution of the judgment; court of
appeals held that a party must file supersedeas bond in order to suspend judgment); Dunlap v. Rotge, 85 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (allegations by property owners
that they were financially unable to stay execution of sale of home by supersedeas bond
pending appeal were not grounds for substituting writ of injunction restraining execution
of sale for supersedeas bond); Cleveland v. Alpine Lumber Co., 70 S.W.2d 257, 257 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) (per curiam) (court not authorized to restrain sale of home pending
appeal except by supersedeas bond).
The Second Circuit interpreted Mudd as an instance when a Texas court refused to
reduce the bond to an amount appellant could afford. See Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1184.
On the contrary, the Texas Court of Appeals reduced the supersedeas bond amount from
the $4,000,000 set by the trial court to $700,122.02, which was the minimum required by
the statute and the amount appellant requested. See Mudd v. Mudd, 665 S.W.2d 128,
129 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
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a provision of a state constitution having no counterpart in the federal
Constitution.3 3 7
The Texas "open courts" provision3 1' differs on its face from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 3 9 It reads in part that
"[a]U courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him...
shall have remedy by due course of law." 3" In addition to the provisions' facial dissimilarity, the Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the
"open courts" provision as encompassing unique rights not contained in
34
the due process clause of the federal Constitution. '
In addition to the facial and substantive dissimilarity of the relevent
provisions, Texas court decisions have not settled the constitutionality of
the Texas supersedeas bond rule. The Second Circuit cited to a line of
Texas decisions that held that a supersedeas bond must be posted in the
full amount of the judgment before execution on the judgment may be
stayed in concluding that Texas law was settled on the issue. 2 None of
these cases, however, specifically involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the rule under the "open courts" provision of the Texas constitution. The holdings in these cases were based on the terms of the statute
337. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
338. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 13. The "open courts" provision states: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods,
person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." Tex. Coast. art. 1, § 13.
The "open courts" provision is one of two due process clauses in the Texas constitution,
the other being embodied in § 19. See infra note 341.
339. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. In contrast to Texas' "open courts" provision, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment states: "[NMor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Coast.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
340. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 13.
341. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1984). In Nelson the court
ruled that a two-year statute of limitations for an action arising out of medical malpractice violates the open courts provision of the state constitution if it cuts off a cause of
action before a party knows or reasonably should know he is injured. See id. at 922. The
plaintiffs in Nelson were the parents of a three-year old infant diagnosed as having muscular dystrophy, a disease impossible for the parents to detect at an earlier age. See id. at
920, 923. The court held that because the statute of limitations required the plaintiffs to
do the impossible in order to pursue their legal remedies, the statute was unconstitutional
under the open courts provision. See &Lat 923.
Statutes of limitation that cut offla party's right of action before a party knows of injury
do not violate the federal due process clause. See Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318,
320-21 (10th Cir. 1984); Mathis v. Eli Lilly, 719 F.2d 134, 137-41 (6th Cir. 1983); Jewson
v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982).
The Nelson court also noted that the "open courts" provision of the Texas constitution
is not coterminous with the due process clause embodied in § 19 of the Texas constitution. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1984).
The § 19 due process clause of the Texas constitution basically mirrors the federal due
process clause: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law
of the land." Tex. Const. art. 1, § 19.
342. See Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1148. For a discussion of these cases, see supra note
336 and infra note 343.
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and did not directly address the constitutionality of the statute itself.3 43
Because Texas raised a challenge to the constitutionality of the provision, 3" it would be inappropriate to determine that such holdings have
"settled" how the Texas courts would rule on such a claim.345
More importantly, the Second Circuit could have held that Texas law
was unsettled as it applied to Texaco regardless of past Texas court decisions on the issue. The facts of this case are so unusual that no previous

Texas court adjudication could possibly have settled the constitutionality
of the bond under these circumstances.34 6 In each of the Texas cases
cited by the court, though a particular party could not raise the bond, it
was theoretically possible for the bond to be raised.3 47 The Second Cir-

cuit's own justification for holding the Texas bond rules unconstitutional
as applied to Texaco was that the amount of the bond would be impossible for anyone to post.3 48 In holding Texas law to be settled in a case
that the Second Circuit itself distinguished from previous Texas deci-

sions,34 9 the court implied that Texas courts would have either failed to

343. See, e.g., Mudd v. Mudd, 665 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (Rule 364
does not authorize trial court to set a bond that would be grossly inequitable); Anderson
v. Pioneer Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 150 S.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (court was
not empowered through writ of injunction to restrain sale of home; plaintiff must file a
supersedeas bond according to statute in order to suspend judgment); Bryan v. Luhning,
106 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ("the Legislature has conferred a statutory
right on the party obtaining judgment to have execution issued thereon" in the absence of
a supersedeas bond); Dunlap v. Rotge, 85 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (a writ
of injunction cannot be substituted for a supersedeas bond); Cleveland v. Alpine Lumber
Co., 70 S.W.2d 257, 257-58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (per curiam) (dismissing request for
injunction because unclear what kind of relief plaintiff sought, but stating in dictum that
judgment can be stayed only by supersedeas bond).
344. See supra note 331.
345. The Second Circuit cited Anderson v. Pioneer Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 150 S.W.2d
445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) to show that Texas courts have refused to permit any flexibility
in the supersedeas bond rule. See Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1184. In Anderson, the Texas
court refused to reduce the bond amount even though this decision meant that a 66-yearold woman who lived on an old-age pension might lose her home. Anderson, 150 S.W.2d
at 445-46.
The Second Circuit emphasized that the Texas supersedeas bond rule was unconstitutional only as applied because of the impossibility of posting a $12 billion bond. See
Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1150. Logically, under the Second Circuit's limitation of its
decision, it would have upheld the constitutionality of the supersedeas bond rule as applied to Anderson had she challenged the statute because the amount of the bond required in Anderson was not impossible to post. See supra note 336.
346. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[W]e are
not called upon to declare the Texas lien and bond provisions to be unconstitutional on
their face but only as applied to the unique and extraordinarycircumstances of this case,
which are unlikely ever to recur because here obtaining a $12 billion bond is impossible.")
(emphasis added).
347. See supra note 336.
348. See Texaco Inc., 784 F.2d at 1150.
349. See id. ("Our exercise of federal jurisdiction under § 1983 does not open any
floodgates. On the contrary, ours is a narrow holding limited to the unusual circumstances of this case. The Texas lien and bond provisions will in most other circumstances
continue to be respected and enforced as written by the Texas legislature and the Texas
Supreme Court.").
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recognize this distinction or imposed an impossible condition on Texaco.
In doing so, not only did the Second Circuit impute an unsound decision
to the Texas judiciary, but, by failing to abstain, the court also deprived
the Texas courts of the opportunity to decide the constitutionality of
their bond rule as applied to these circumstances.
Because the Second Circuit determined that the Texas supersedeas
bond rule was clear, 5 0 it did not address the remaining Pullman requirements. Under the second requirement of Pullman a federal court need
not abstain if a federal constitutional decision will be necessary regardless
of state court construction of state law.-35 ' Had the Texas courts modified the bond requirement under the state constitution, there would have
been no need for the district court or the Second Circuit to decide the
question under the federal Constitution.
Finally, Pullman abstention would not have been appropriate unless
the court found that the state law issue could be resolved under Texas
procedures.3 52 In analyzing Texaco's claim under the Younger doctrine,
the Second Circuit held that Texas courts did not provide Texaco with
adequate procedures to raise its constitutional claims. 5 3 There is basis
for the Second Circuit's conclusion that an "extraordinary" writ such as
a writ of mandamus is an inadequate procedure, 354 but a contrary finding
would also be supportable. Texaco was protected from financial collapse
by paragraph 7 of the Texas trial judgment,355 and Texas case law indicates that Texas' writ of mandamus has been used to reduce the bond
amount set by a trial court.35 6
Because the facts of this case satisfied the three requirements of Pull350. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
354. See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., supra F.2d 1133, 1151 (2d Cir. 1986). Two other
circuits have held that if the only procedure available is through mandamus proceedings,
then abstention is not merited. See Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 684 (6th Cir.
1985) (abstention inappropriate where only procedure available to raise federal claims
was by writ of mandamus); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 267
n.7 (2d Cir. 1968) (same).
355. See paragraph 7, supra note 13.
356. See Mudd v. Mudd, 665 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). Mudd reduced a
supersedeas bond that had been set in excess of the statutory minimum by writ of mandamus. See supra note 308.
The Fourth Circuit in Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 983 (1974), held that an order which prohibited federal plaintiffs and other members
of the public from entering school property was "possibly overbroad" but refused to enjoin the state court under Younger in the absence of a showing that the overbreadth
"[could not] be cured by an immediate appeal to the state appellate courts, the use of
prerogative writs by those courts, or even by defending at the final trial on the merits
before the superior court." Id. at 775-76. In Winslow v. Leh, 577 F. Supp. 951 (D. Colo.
1984), the district court refused to enjoin collection of a state court judgment under both
Pullman and Younger because the federal plaintiff could raise a due process challenge in
state court through a writ of certiorari "as well as certain extraordinary writs." See id. at
952-53.
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man, the Second Circuit could have invoked Pullman and abstained
while Texas courts settled the underlying state law questions.
Though the Supreme Court has developed tests for determining
whether Younger or Pullman abstention is warranted, the criteria used
are too ambiguous to provide substantive guidance. The standards are
particularly undefined regarding the still-developing Younger doctrine,
but even the relatively settled Pullman doctrine permits equally "correct" but inconsistent results. The Second Circuit's application of the
Younger and Pullman doctrines can be criticized as not giving enough
attention to the principles of comity and federalism underlying Younger
and Pullman. However, a fair analysis cannot conclude that its decision
to enjoin Pennzoil was erroneous given the flexibility of the Younger and
Pullman abstention tests.
CONCLUSION

The unique facts of this case have illuminated subtle tensions in the
complex doctrines of federalism and jurisdiction. Texaco's federal claims
placed the Second Circuit in an unenviable position. The potential devastation of one of this nation's largest corporations inevitably weighed
heavily on the three members of the panel. Before hearing this case, the
court had to satisfy the requirements of jurisdiction, the Anti-Injunction
Act and abstention. The potential impact of this decision on the role of
the federal courts within the dual judicial system makes a thorough evaluation of the fundamental precepts of these doctrines imperative. This
Comment has attempted to set forth the relevant avenues of inquiry and
to propose an analytical framework rooted in the principles underlying
jurisdiction, the Anti-Injunction Act and abstention.
Traditionally, to avoid friction between state and federal courts, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal jurisdiction over claims that
either have been previously raised in state court or that raise issues "inextricably intertwined" with prior state court litigation. Many courts, including the Second Circuit, declined to apply this doctrine to cases in
which the federal claim had not yet been raised in state court. However,
the principles of federalism and comity underlying Rooker-Feldman suggest that even claims that have not been raised in state court may be
denied a federal forum. When federal court intervention would generate
friction between state and federal courts and waste judicial resources,
and Supreme Court review would otherwise be available, a principled
application of the doctrine should bar federal jurisdiction.
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations, occurring under
color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution of the United
States. When a private party is alleged to have violated Section 1983,
courts have generally inquired whether the private party's conduct was
the type of "state action" proscribed by the Constitution and Section
1983. The Second Circuit, like many other courts, focused this inquiry
on whether state officials had participated in the challenged conduct.
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However, because the Constitution imposes limits on the exercise of governmental power, the inquiry should focus on the nature of the power
exercised by the private party. For a private party to truly act as the
state it must not only invoke a state procedure. It must also substitute its
judgment for that of the state in deciding to employ the government's
power. By thus examining the nature of the private conduct, rather than
the role of state officials, the inquiry would directly address the Constitution's concerns with limiting the exercise of governmental power.
Because Section 1983 actions are excepted from the Anti-Injunction
Act's limits on federal court injunctions of state proceedings, extension of
Section 1983 jurisdiction mandates reanalysis of the proper role of the
Act. The present approach to the Act exempts Section 1983 actions
from this congressional ban while simultaneously imposing judiciallycreated Younger doctrine to deny injunctive relief to Section 1983 plaintiffs. From the Anti-Injunction Act's obscure origins to later interpretations of the Act as a fundamental congressional policy aimed at
preserving the dual court system, the principles of federalism and comity
underlying the Act have been applied inconsistently.
Injunctions of state court proceedings in Section 1983 actions were determined to be expressly authorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act based on the broad congressional objectives of Section 1983. Despite
the conclusion that Section 1983 empowers federal courts to intervene to
protect individuals against unconstitutional state court actions, the
Supreme Court continues to deny federal injunctions under the Younger
doctrine. The substitution of judicial determinations under Younger for
analysis of congressional intent under the Anti-Injunction Act deposes
Congress from its role in determining federal court power in relation to
state courts. The court's approach to the Act also frustrates the congressional objectives expressed in Section 1983. The inherent conflict between Mitchum's finding that Congress intended Section 1983 to
authorize injunctions and Younger's invocation of federalism to deny
such injunctions should not be resolved by piecemeal adjudication.
Finally, the expansion of Section 1983 jurisdiction and the consequent
collapse of the Anti-Injunction Act have combined to bestow enlarged
significance on the doctrines of abstention. As a result, abstention under
such bases as the Younger and Pullman doctrines exist as the most important embodiments of comity and federalism. Unfortunately, the malleability of the applicable doctrinal standards can negate the impact these
abstention doctrines have on the role of the federal courts in a dual judicial system. Therefore, care must be exercised to include considerations
of comity and federalism in abstention analysis.
Under Younger abstention federal courts have declined to abstain by
finding either that the relevant state interest falls outside the few interests
previously recognized by the Supreme Court as important or that state
procedures are too uncertain or slow to provide adequate relief. The
mechanical application of Younger, however, contravenes the principles
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of comity and federalism underlying the doctrine, which should be considered regardless of the state interest implicated. Likewise, analysis of
state procedures should be made with the due respect to the state judiciary required by federalism and comity. If not applied along with these
considerations, the technical Younger standards are susceptible to interpretations contrary to the principles underlying Younger itself.
Pullman abstention requires that when a federal constitutional claim is
premised on an unsettled question of state law, federal courts should abstain from hearing the federal claim to allow the state courts the opportunity to decide the underlying state law question. Abstention under
Pullman minimizes federal-state tension and avoids potentially unnecessary constitutional adjudication. The requirements for invoking Pullman
abstention as adopted by the Supreme Court are also susceptible to varying conclusions. As a result, under both Younger and Pullman abstention, the criteria on which a decision must lie can be too vague and
malleable to provide substantive guidance, a situation that can only be
remedied by principled consideration of the notions of federalism and
comity that underlie the doctrine of abstention.
The doctrines and standards of jurisdiction, the Anti-Injunction Act
and abstention provide guidance to federal courts in most cases. The
pressing facts of Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., however, forced the Second
Circuit to resolve unforeseen and novel interpretations and extensions of
these doctrines. The unique circumstances of this case thrust the court
into an area devoid of explicit precedent, but not without guidance. By
focusing on the principles of comity and federalism inherent in a dual
judicial system, courts faced with similar dilemmas will find themselves
equipped to reach principled, consistent and just decisions.
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